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Abstract
The Competition Complexity of an auction measures how much competition is needed for
the revenue of a simple auction to surpass the optimal revenue. A classic result from auction
theory by Bulow and Klemperer [10], states that the Competition Complexity of VCG, in the
case of n i.i.d. buyers and a single item, is 1. In other words, it is better to invest in recruiting
one extra buyer and run a second price auction than to invest in learning exactly the buyers’
underlying distribution and run the revenue-maximizing auction tailored to this distribution.
In this paper we study the Competition Complexity of dynamic auctions. Consider the
following problem: a monopolist is auctioning offm items inm consecutive stages to n interested
buyers. A buyer realizes her value for item k in the beginning of stage k. How many additional
buyers are necessary and sufficient for a second price auction at each stage to extract revenue
at least that of the optimal dynamic auction? We prove that the Competition Complexity
of dynamic auctions is at most 3n - and at least linear in n - even when the buyers’ values
are correlated across stages, under a monotone hazard rate assumption on the stage (marginal)
distributions. This assumption can be relaxed if one settles for independent stages. We also
prove results on the number of additional buyers necessary for VCG at every stage to be an
α-approximation of the optimal revenue; we term this number the α-approximate Competition
Complexity. For example, under the same mild assumptions on the stage distributions we prove
that one extra buyer suffices for a 1
e
-approximation. As a corollary we provide the first results on
prior-independent dynamic auctions. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first non-trivial
positive guarantees for simple ex-post IR dynamic auctions for correlated stages.
A key step towards proving bounds on the Competition Complexity is getting a good bench-
mark/upper bound to the optimal revenue. To this end, we extend the recent duality framework
of Cai et al. [13] to dynamic settings. As an aside to our approach we obtain a revenue non-
monotonicity lemma for dynamic auctions, which may be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
A monopolist is auctioning off m items in m consecutive stages to n interested buyers. A buyer
learns her value for the k-th item at the beginning of stage k. For the future items only a prior
distribution is known. The prior of buyer i depends on the values of that buyer for the items
so far. How should this monopolist behave in order to maximize her expected revenue? The
optimal dynamic mechanism can be extremely complex, both computationally and in terms of
its description. Even worse, the optimal mechanism depends on detailed knowledge of the buyers’
distributions (across time) in intricate ways. This paper aims to answer the following question: Can
we design simple dynamic mechanisms that do not depend on details of the underlying distributions?
We are not the first to face such problems. Optimal mechanisms can be extremely complex
even for a static auction with a single additive buyer (e.g. m uniform i.i.d. items on [c, c + 1] as
observed by Daskalakis et al. [23]). But even for the case of n i.i.d. buyers and a single item for
sale, where Myerson’s theory [47] readily applies, the necessity of good prior information makes the
solution somewhat less appealing in practice. Can this be avoided? An elegant result from auction
theory, by Bulow and Klemperer [10], states that the revenue of a second price auction with n+ 1
buyers with valuations drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution1 is at least that of the optimal
auction, tailored for the exact distributions, for n buyers. In other words, it is better to invest in
recruiting one more agent and run VCG, than to invest in exactly learning the underlying value
distribution and then run the revenue-maximizing auction tailored to this distribution. One of the
reasons this theorem is so appealing is that VCG is prior-independent, meaning its description is
independent of the underlying distribution. The Bulow-Klemperer theorem can also be seen as
a “resource augmentation” argument. The optimal auction extracts more revenue than a second
price auction by definition; their theorem gives an intuitive characterization of how much.
In this paper we prove the first Bulow-Klemperer type results for dynamic auctions. We are
interested in the number of additional buyers necessary (these extra buyers will be present in all
stages) for a second price auction at every stage to have expected revenue at least that of the optimal
dynamic auction. We adopt the terminology of Eden et al. [27] and call this number the Competition
Complexity. We also define the α-approximate Competition Complexity to be the extra number of
buyers necessary for a second price auction at each stage to be an α approximation (in terms
of revenue) of the optimal dynamic auction2. Thus, in this terminology, Bulow and Klemperer’s
theorem says that the Competition Complexity of a single item static auction with n buyers is 1.
The original result of Bulow-Klemperer stems from our deep understanding of revenue optimal
auctions in the single item case, thanks to Myerson’s work. In contrast, maximizing revenue in
dynamic or other multi-dimensional environments is poorly understood. Moreover, known gaps
([49]) between the revenue of adaptive and non-adaptive dynamic auctions imply that assumptions
stronger than regularity of the stage distributions will be necessary. Despite these obstacles, for
correlated stages we can show the following bounds:
Informal Theorem 1. In the case of n buyers and m correlated stages (the value of buyer i
on stage k can be correlated with past and future values, but not with other buyers’ values), if
all the stage (marginal) distributions have monotone hazard rate (MHR)3: (1) The Competition
Complexity is at most 3n and at least (e− 1)n; (2) The 1
e
-approximate Competition Complexity is
1; (3) The 13-approximate Competition Complexity is 0.
1A distributionD with density f and cumulative density F is regular if Myerson’s virtual function φ(v) = v− 1−F (v)
f(v)
is monotone non-decreasing.
2We use the term α-Competition Complexity to have a single language when stating our results. As we see later
though, strictly outperforming OPT is a much more challenging task than getting an α approximation.
3A distribution has monotone hazard rate (MHR) if its hazard rate h(v) = f(v)
1−F (v)
is monotone non-decreasing.
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In other words, if the stage distributions have monotone hazard rate, recruiting 3n additional
buyers is strictly better than learning all m stage distributions exactly, including the possible corre-
lation between stages. If an approximation of 1
e
suffices, only one additional buyer is necessary. Even
more surprisingly, simply running a second price auction at each stage extracts a 13 -approximation
of the optimal revenue. These bounds hold even against ex-ante IR dynamic auctions. In other
words, running a second price auction at each stage, which requires no distributional knowledge
whatsoever, is a 13 approximation to the impossible benchmark of an optimal, ex-ante IR auction
that uses full knowledge of the buyers’ arbitrarily correlated distributions!
Many common families of distributions such as the Uniform, Exponential and Normal have
MHR. To get the theorem we prove new bounds on the expected order statistics of MHR distribu-
tions and combine them with an upper bound (for the optimal dynamic revenue) equal to the social
welfare, i.e. the sum (over stages) of the expected first order statistic E [(Xk)1:n] of n i.i.d. samples
from the stage distribution Xk. The expected second order statistic E [X2:n], i.e. the expected
second highest value, from n i.i.d. samples from distribution X is equal to the expected revenue
of a second price auction with n buyers from X. For our Competition Complexity result we need
a strict inequality between the expected second order statistic E [X2:n+c] of n+ c samples and the
expected first order statistic E [X1:n] (the expected highest value, the social welfare) of n samples.
More specifically, we need to find a c large enough for E [X2:n+c] to be at least as large as E [X1:n].
For MHR distributions strong tail bounds are known (see for example Cai and Daskalakis [11]),
that can be used for approximations of the expected order statistics, by combining for example with
Markov-type inequalities4. If we insist on strict bounds though, we cannot afford to use such lossy
arguments, and new ideas are necessary. We postpone further discussion until the next Section
where we formally define the model. We proceed to explore the extent to which the assumption on
the stage distributions can be relaxed.
Informal Theorem 2. In the case of n buyers and m independent stages, ex-post IR dynamic
auctions, ifm−1 stage distributions have monotone hazard rate and the remaining stage distribution
is regular, the bounds on the Competition Complexity and α-approximate Competition Complexity
are the same as Informal Theorem 1.
This theorem requires much better upper bounds on the optimal dynamic revenue, which we
obtain via an extension of the duality framework recently proposed by Cai et al. [13]. The upper
bound in Cai et al. [13] improves on the trivial upper bound of the social welfare by substituting
the value of each buyer’s favorite item with the corresponding Myerson’s virtual value. Our bound
resembles this format: the largest expected first order statistic is substituted by the corresponding
expected virtual value, i.e. optimal (static) revenue. Moreover, our dual solution also induces a
virtual value function Φk(.) at each stage k. The benchmarks we get from duality do not depend
on “tail assumptions” like regularity and monotone hazard rate, but they do need stage distribu-
tions to be independent; the tail assumptions are necessary for the revenue of VCG to surpass the
benchmark. Even though they can’t be materialized into Competition Complexity bounds, we can
prove some general upper bounds for correlated stages, under a stochastic dominance condition,
using the same technique. We also use the duality framework as a tool in answering the following
question: How does correlation affect the optimal revenue? In other words, moving from indepen-
dent to correlated stages (while keeping the stage marginals the same) makes the optimal revenue
increase or decrease? We defer details and further discussion until the next Section.
4Incidentally, the approximations between the expected first and second order statistics we present here don’t
use this approach directly. We instead take an “auction flavored” approach and go through a comparison with the
revenue of Myerson’s auction.
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Back to the Competition Complexity, can the tail assumptions on the stage distributions be
relaxed even further? Surprisingly, the answer is no! If two stage distributions are regular, even
if the stages are independent, there is only a single buyer and we ask for non-negative utility at
each stage (ex-post IR), the α-Competition Complexity is unbounded, for all constants α > 0. We
conclude this introduction with an example from Papadimitriou et al. [49] that shows that running
the optimal static auction at each stage is not a constant approximation of the optimal dynamic
auction; the lower bound on the α-Competition Complexity is an immediate corollary.
Example 1 (Papadimitriou et al. [49]). Let X1 and X2 be the random variables indicating the
value of the buyer for the first and second stage item. X1 takes value 2
i with probability 2−i
for i = 1, . . . , n, and value 0 with probability 2−n. X2 takes value 2i with probability 2−i for
i = 1, . . . , 2n, and value 0 with probability 2−2
n
. It can be verified that the optimal static auction
for both X1 and X2 extracts revenue at most 2 ( Consider setting some price 2
k. The expected
revenue is at most 2k ·∑i≥k 2−i ≤ 2 ). Therefore, running the optimal static auction at each stage
extracts revenue at most 4. On the other hand, there exists a dynamic mechanism that extracts
revenue n: on the first stage the buyer pays her report vˆ. On the second stage the item is given for
free with probability vˆ
E[X2]
5. An easy calculation shows that truthful reporting is a weakly dominant
strategy. The revenue extracted is E [X1] = n.
6 The intuition here is that if the expected value of
the future item is large, the buyer is willing to pay her value on the first stage for a better probability
of getting allocated the future item.
2 Preliminaries and Main Results
2.1 Multi-Stage Auctions.
A seller sells m items to n buyers in m consecutive stages. The value of buyer i for the item on
stage k is vik ∈ V ik =
[
vik, v
i
k
]
and is distributed according to a random variable Xik. These random
variables are independent among buyers, but for the same buyer can be correlated across stages,
i.e. Xik can be correlated with X
i
k′ , but not with X
i′
k . X
i
k has distribution D
i
k with density f
i
k and
cumulative density F ik. It will be often convenient to use random variables rather than distributions
and thus we use X and D interchangeably. Throughout this paper we use superscript to denote
an agent and subscript to denote the stage. We write Xk =
∏n
i=1X
i
k for the product distribution
for stage k (across all buyers). Let X be the input to the seller’s problem; X includes all the
stage distributions, as well as their correlation. Since we’re interested in Bulow-Klemperer type
theorems, the distribution of Xik is the same for all buyers i and therefore we drop the superscript
whenever applicable. We assume that the value for each item is revealed at the beginning of each
stage: at the beginning of stage k, buyer i knows her private history vi<k =
(
vi1, v
i
2, . . . , v
i
k−1
)
, her
value vik for the item in stage k, as well as the public history vˆ<k =
(
vˆ11:k−1, vˆ
2
1:k−1, . . . , vˆ
n
1:k−1
)
,
where vˆia:b =
(
vˆia, vˆ
i
a+1, . . . , vˆ
i
b
)
is the vector of reported values of agent i for stages a through b.
From the revelation principle, it is sufficient to consider direct revelation mechanisms. A mech-
anism M is a sequence of m allocation functions (x1, . . . xm) and m payment functions (p1, . . . pm),
both taking as input all the reported valuations so far v≤k. The allocation function for stage k
has a component xik (v≤k) that represents the probability that buyer i gets the item in stage k.
Similarly, the payment function for stage k has a component pik (v≤k) for the payment of buyer i
in stage k. A mechanism is feasible if for all stages k and all histories v≤k, xik (v≤k) ∈ [0, 1] for all
5Notice that E [X2] > 2
n, therefore vˆ
E[X2]
is a probability.
6A similar example can be constructed for continuous distributions. See Ashlagi et al. [2].
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agents i, and
∑n
i=1 x
i
k (v≤k) ≤ 1. We assume quasi-linear utilities; the utility of buyer i in stage k
is vik · xik (v≤k)− pik (v≤k).
Incentive Compatibility. At stage k we would like to have a mechanism where agent i, with
real value vik, maximizes her utility when reporting v
i
k, among all possible reports vˆ
i
k. This utility
is in expectation over the other agents’ current values, as well as her own and other agents’ future
values. When deciding what value vˆik to report in stage k, the agent has to take into account that
the future allocation and payments (and therefore the future utility) will be affected by this report.
It could be the case that lying only in stage k or lying only in stage k + 1 results in lower overall
utility, but lying in both stages results in a higher utility! Thus, when deciding when to lie, the
buyer must choose in advance a strategy that deviates from the truth now and in the future.
Let Sk be the set of all “future deviation strategies” at stage k. A deviating strategy s ∈ Sk is a
function from possible “futures”, i.e. elements of
∏n
i=1
∏m
t=k+1 V
i
t to possible reports, i.e. elements
of (vˆk+1, . . . , vˆm) ∈ Vk+1:m =
∏m
i=k+1 Vi. Note that in our definition of Sk the deviation in stage
k is not included. A mechanism is incentive compatible if, for every buyer i, every stage k, all
possible histories v<k, for all values v
i
k ∈ Vk on stage k, and all possible current deviations vˆik ∈ Vk
and future deviation strategies s ∈ Sk:
E
v
−i
≥k
,vi
k+1:m
[∑
j≥k v
i
jx
i
j
(
v−i≤j, v
i
1:k−1, v
i
k, v
i
k+1:j
)
− pij
(
v−i≤j, v
i
1:k−1, v
i
k, v
i
k+1:j
)]
≥
E
v
−i
≥k
,vi
k+1:m
[∑
j≥k v
i
jx
i
j
(
v−i≤j, v
i
1:k−1vˆ
i
k, s
(
v−ik:j, v
i
k:j
))
− pij
(
v−i≤j , v
i
1:k−1, vˆ
i
k, s
(
v−ik:j, v
i
k:j
))]
(1)
Intuitively, buyer i at stage k compares her expected utility when telling the truth now and in
the future, with her expected utility for reporting vˆik now, s
(
v−ik:j, v
i
k:j
)
in stage j, where v−ik:j is
the rest of the buyers’ values in stages k through j and vik:j are the true values of buyer i in stages
k through j. If Sk is the set of all function from
∏n
i=1
∏m
t=k+1 V
i
t to
∏m
i=k+1 Vi, and Equation 1 is
satisfied, we say that the mechanism is incentive compatible in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. If
Sk only includes the “identity function”, i.e. the agent assumes truthful reporting for future stages,
we say that the mechanism is periodic incentive compatible.
Individual Rationality. For IR we focus on the two extremes: ex-post and ex-ante. The latter
notion asks for every buyer’s expected utility at every stage to be non-negative. Formally, for every
buyer i, every stage k, all possible histories v<k, for all values v
i
k ∈ Vk on stage k:
E
v
−i
≥k
,vi
k+1:m
[∑
j≥k v
i
jx
i
j
(
v−i≤j , v
i
k:j
)
− pij
(
v−i≤j, v
i
k:j
)]
≥ 0 (2)
Ex-post individual rationality asks for every buyer’s utility to be non-negative at every stage,
no matter what the other buyers’ valuations are. Formally, for every buyer i, stage k, and possible
history v≤k:
vik · xik (v≤k)− pik (v≤k) ≥ 0. (3)
The seller’s problem. The seller’s goal is to find the revenue optimal mechanism that is incen-
tive compatible and individually rational. Let OPT [X , n,m] denote the revenue of the optimal
mechanism for n buyers and m stages, when the buyers’ valuations are drawn according to X .
For the special case of m = 1 the solution is given by Myerson [47]. For a general m, the seller’s
problem can be expressed as a linear program with variables xik and p
i
k, objective
maxE
[∑m
k=1
∑n
i=1 p
i
k (v≤k)
]
,
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subject to constraints 1, constraints 2 or 3, as well as the allocation x being feasible (a linear
constraint). Note that the seller’s revenue is smaller for ex-post IR than ex-ante IR. Furthermore,
it weakly decreases as the set Sk of deviations considered becomes larger. Therefore, the best upper
bounds possible would be for ex-ante IR and periodic IC.
2.2 Competition Complexity.
Let Rev [M,X , n,m] denote the expected revenue of running auction M at every stage, for m
stages, with n buyers whose values are drawn according to X . We are interested in the number c
of extra buyers necessary such that Rev [V CG,X , n+ c,m] is at least OPT [X , n,m], where V CG
is simply a second price auction. This number is called the Competition Complexity with respect
to V CG, defined by Eden et al. [27]. We also study approximations:
Definition 1. The α-approximate Competition Complexity with respect to V CG is the minimum
number c such that Rev [V CG,X , n + c,m] is at least α ·OPT [X , n,m].
Note that we can define the α-approximate Competition Complexity and Competition Com-
plexity to be with respect to any prior-independent auction M . In this work we focus on V CG. At
a high level our approach is the following: (1) Find an upper bound B (X , n,m) to OPT [X , n,m].
(2) Prove that the revenue of running a second price auction at every stage with c additional buy-
ers (present in every stage) yields revenue at least B (X , n,m). We present each step separately.
For different distributions and different constraints the bounds in steps (1) and (2) are different.
Our final bounds on the Competition Complexity come from mixing and matching these different
bounds.
2.3 Upper bounds on OPT [X , n,m].
Buyers’ valuations Xik on stage k are independent draws from a distribution Xk. We can arrange
the values in a descending order: (Xk)1:n ≥ (Xk)2:n ≥ · · · ≥ (Xk)n:n. We call (Xk)r:n the r-th order
statistic7. Given a product distribution Xk =
∏n
i=1Xk, let Mye [Xk] be the revenue of Myerson’s
optimal auction, i.e. the revenue optimal mechanism for a one-shot auction where buyers’ valuations
are drawn i.i.d. from Xk. Our upper bounds on OPT [X , n,m] do not require any tail assumptions.
Social welfare. Our first upper bound on OPT [X , n,m] is the trivial one: the social welfare.
At every stage k we can extract revenue at most the expected maximum valuation at that stage.
Claim 1. OPT [X , n,m] ≤∑mk=1 E [(Xk)1:n] , where (Xk)1:n is the highest-order statistic of n i.i.d.
samples drawn from Xk.
Note that this bound holds even for ex-ante IR and periodic IC mechanisms, and even if the
stages are correlated8. Surprisingly, as we see later, if we restrict the marginal distributions at each
stage to have monotone hazard rate we can still provide bounds on the Competition Complexity
even with this trivial upper bound.
7We write Xr:n for the r-th order statistic of n samples from a distribution X. In the auctions context we write
vt:t′ = (vt, vt+1, . . . , vt′) for the reported values in stages t through t
′. It will be clear from context which of the two
notions we refer to.
8Recall that we allow the value vik of agent i in stage k to be correlated with her value in stage k
′. We don’t allow
this value to be correlated with some other value vjk of a different agent.
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Duality based bounds. To improve on the trivial bound we ask for (1) independent stages,
(2) ex-post IR mechanisms. Ex-post IR dynamic mechanisms have received a lot of attention in
recent works, e.g. Papadimitriou et al. [49], Ashlagi et al. [2], Mirrokni et al. [43, 45], Balseiro et al.
[5], because of their practicality9. Our improved bound is as follows. Choose any stage j; the
contribution of stage j is Mye [Xj ], the optimal revenue we would extract from stage j in a non-
dynamic setting. The contribution of every other stage k 6= j is the expected maximum E [(Xk)1:n]
of n samples drawn from Xk.
Lemma 1. For independent stages, ex-post IR and periodic IC dynamic mechanisms
OPT [X , n,m] ≤ minj=1,...,m
{
Mye [Xj ] +
∑m
k=1,k 6=j E [(Xk)1:n]
}
,
where (Xk)1:n is the highest-order statistic of n samples drawn from Xk, and Xj is the product
distribution for stage j.
Our proof is via an extension of the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework to the dynamic
setting. The work of Cai et al. [13] unified many different recent advances in Bayesian mechanism
design by providing an approximately tight upper bound for the optimal revenue using a single
dual solution. In their work, they start from a certain linear program for revenue maximization and
Lagrangify the Bayesian IC and IR constraints. By Lagrangifying the IC and IR constraints of our
linear program for maximizing revenue in the dynamic setting we can get similar characterizations.
The bound of Cai et al. [13] improves on the social welfare upper bound by substituting the value of
each buyer’s favorite item with the corresponding Myerson’s virtual value. Our bound substitutes
the largest expected order statistic with the corresponding expected virtual value. In order to
develop some intuition we first prove the single agent, two stage case in Section 3. The general
proof can be found in Appendix A.
One can prove Lemma 1 by using a characterization Lemma of Ashlagi et al. [2] for the optimal
dynamic, ex-post IR mechanism in this setting. Regardless, we believe that the extension of Cai-
Devanur-Weinberg framework in the dynamic setting is an important conceptual contribution of this
paper and we expect it to have further applications in the design and analysis of dynamic auctions
in more general settings. To this end, even though it can’t be materialized into a Competition
Complexity result, we use the duality framework to prove a bound similar to Lemma 1 for correlated
stages that satisfy a stochastic dominance structure; details can be found in Appendix B. We also
use the framework in the revenue non-monotonicity Lemma presented next.
Discrete vs Continuous. For simplicity of presentation, we prove Lemma 1 for distributions
with discrete support. Our proof can be easily modified to hold for continuous distributions.
Who benefits from correlation? A revenue non-monotonicity lemma.
Given Lemma 1, a bound for the revenue of dynamic auctions with independent stages, one can ask
if the same bound holds for correlated stages. A perhaps more natural question is: Does correlation
help the buyer or the seller? For example, in the case of two stages and a single agent, let X1 and
X2 be the random variables denoting the buyer’s valuations for the first and second stage, and let
OPT be expected revenue of the optimal IC and ex-post IR auction, in the case that X1 and X2
9Ex-ante IR mechanisms are less appealing because of the following unsettling property: the seller can extract
revenue equal to the social welfare by (roughly) charging the social welfare upfront, before the buyers have realized
their future values. This makes sense for utility maximizers in a stylized model, but limits the applicability of the
auctions produced.
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are independent. Let OPT be expected revenue of the optimal auction if X1 and X2 are correlated
(but the marginal distributions for each stage remain the same). Is it the case that OPT is always
larger or always smaller than OPT? There are two opposing intuitions. On one hand, one could
argue that when the buyer reports her value on the first stage she reveals more information to the
seller if the stages are correlated compared to when the stages are independent. Therefore, the
seller has to pay “information rents” to the buyer, and thus the expected revenue of the correlated
stages is lower than the expected revenue of independent stages with identical marginals. On the
other hand, before the buyer reports her first stage value, the seller knows more about how the
buyer’s values evolve across stages. This additional knowledge could be used to increase revenue
compared to the independent stages case. In Section 5 we show that both scenarios are possible.
Lemma 2. Moving from independent to correlated stages while keeping the marginal (stage) dis-
tributions identical may increase or decrease the revenue of the optimal dynamic auction.
Proving such a statement requires being able to identify the optimal dynamic auction, or a good
upper bound for the revenue of the optimal dynamic auction, for independent as well as correlated
stages. Even for two fixed distributions X1 and X2 it is not clear how to argue about what the
optimal dynamic auction is capable of when X1 and X2 are correlated. Furthermore, E [X1]+E [X2]
will not do; the bound must be affected by the correlation. We provide upper bounds via duality;
we cite this as another usage of the duality framework developed in this paper.
2.4 Lower bounds on the revenue of Vickrey.
After finding suitable bounds forOPT [X , n,m], we need to show that the revenue of VCG (a second
price auction at each stage) with additional buyers surpasses these bounds. A first observation is
that the expected revenue of VCG is the expected second order statistic:
Observation 1. The expected revenue of a second price auction with n agents whose values are
drawn i.i.d. from X is E [X2:n].
Our upper bounds on OPT [X , n,m] ( Claim 1 and Lemma 1 ) are sums overm terms. The term
that corresponds to stage k is either the expected revenue of the optimal static auction Mye [Xk]
for that stage, or the expected highest order statistic E [X1:n] of n samples. We upper bound each
term separately. This gives us a sufficient number of extra buyers, i.e. an upper bound on the
Competition Complexity. For the terms involving the optimal static auction, the original Theorem
of Bulow and Klemperer provides a good bound for E [X2:n+c] and regular distributions:
Theorem 1 (Bulow-Klemperer). Let X be a random variable with a regular distribution D. Let
X be the product distribution of n samples drawn i.i.d from D. Then E [X2:n+1] ≥Mye [X].
The following corollary can be shown:
Corollary 1. Let X be a random variable with a regular distribution D. Let X be the product
distribution of n samples drawn i.i.d from D. Then E [X2:n] ≥ n−1n Mye [X]. In other words, the
revenue of a second price auction is an n−1
n
approximation to the revenue of the optimal auction.
We first note that for terms involving the expected highest order statistic similar bounds are
impossible for regular distributions, as we’ve already seen in Example 1:
Example 2. Let X be a random variable following the equal revenue distribution with F (x) = 1− 1
x
,
for x ∈ [1,∞). E [X] = ∫∞0 1xdx is unbounded, while E [X2:n] = n− 1, i.e. bounded for all n.10.The
10See Claim 7 in Appendix C for a calculation.
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example can be modified to hold for truncated distributions: for all n, there exists a truncation value
V , such that for the truncated distribution E [X] > E [X2:n].
Therefore, in order to get a bound on the Competition Complexity we need to impose a re-
striction stronger than regularity on some stage distributions. A natural candidate is distributions
with Monotone Hazard Rate; a distribution has Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) if its hazard rate
h(v) = f(v)1−F (v) is monotone non-decreasing. MHR distributions are a subset of regular distributions
and have various nice properties, like bounded expected order statistics, small tails, etc. In this
paper we show the following new bounds:
Theorem 2. Let Xr:n be the r-th order statistic of n i.i.d samples from a continuous distribution
X with monotone hazard rate. Then: (1) E [X2:4n] ≥ E [X1:n].(2) E [X2:n+1] ≥ 1eE [X1:n]; (3)
E [X2:n] ≥ 13E [X1:n].
MHR distributions have been studied extensively in the Statistics literature under the (perhaps
better) name of IHR, Increasing Hazard Rate, and IFR, Increasing Failure Rate (e.g. Barlow and
Proschan [6], Barlow and Proschan [7])11. A common trick when working with MHR distributions
is to write the cdf as F (x) = 1−e−
∫ x
0 h(z)dz12. Then, since h(x) is non-decreasing, H(x) =
∫ x
0 h(z)dz
is a convex function. Using one sided bounds for H(x) (for example a linear approximation) one can
provide lower bounds and upper bounds for quantities like the expected minimum of two samples
(e.g. [1, 26, 39]). When working with order statistics of many samples though, one sided bounds
such as these do not work, since the closed form for the expected second order statistic has both
positive and negative terms that involve H(x). Moreover, taking more samples will not compensate
for a lossy argument; the proofs need to work for distributions that are essentially point masses,
where all the order statistics are equal for any number of samples.
For each of the bounds in Theorem 2 we take a different approach. For the first one, we
start by showing a one sample bound: E [X2:4] ≥ E [X]. This bound is tight for the exponential
distribution (in a sense that E [X2:3] < E [X]). We first prove that the inequality is strict whenH(x)
is piece-wise linear and convex, and then show that every convex function with bounded domain
can be approximated by a piece-wise linear function. We combine the one sample result, the fact
that order statistics of MHR distributions have MHR distributions themselves, and a coupling
argument to generalize to n samples. For the second bound, E [X2:n+1] ≥ 1eE [X1:n], we take an
“auction flavored” approach. First, the LHS is at least Mye [X] using Bulow and Klemperer’s
result. Second, we compare Mye [X] with Mye [X1:n], the expected revenue of the optimal auction
in a (one-shot) single agent auction with distribution X1:n, using a coupling argument. Third,
since order statistics of MHR distributions have MHR distributions, we can use known bounds to
compare Mye [X1:n] and E [X1:n]. For the last bound, E [X2:n] ≥ 13E [X1:n], we combine a (known)
bound on the expected minimum of two samples from an MHR distribution with the (also known)
fact that spacings of order statistics of MHR distributions, i.e. E [X1:n]−E [X2:n], are non-increasing
functions of the number of samples. We prove Theorem 2 as three separate Lemmas in Section 4.
Discrete vs Continuous. For a distribution over a discrete domain {1, 2, . . . , N}, the definition
of hazard rate is h(i) = p(i)∑
j≥i p(j)
(see Barlow and Proschan [7]). Some known inequalities for MHR
distributions fail for the discrete case. For example, for continuous MHR distributions one can
show that Pr[X ≥ E [X]] ≥ 1
e
; the inequality fails for a geometric distribution. Our proofs hold
only for continuous distributions. It remains open whether the statements are true for discrete
MHR distributions.
11To keep consistency with the auctions community we refer to them as MHR distributions in this paper.
12See Claim 4 in Appendix D for an explanation.
8
2.5 Putting everything together.
By combining the different upper bounds on OPT [X , n,m] with the corresponding lower bounds
for VCG we can get upper bounds for the Competition Complexity and approximate Competition
Complexity of dynamic auctions. We prove our lower bounds for the Competition Complexity in
Appendix C. Our lower bounds work for (1) independent stages, m MHR distributions, for ex-
ante IR auctions (applied in Theorem 3), and (2) independent stages, m − 1 MHR and 1 regular
distribution, for ex-post IR auctions (applied in Theorem 4). The proofs are similar. The auction
in the second bound is a generalization of Example 1. The auction in the first bound exploits an
unsettling feature of ex-ante IR mechanisms: the buyers are willing to give up their expected future
(net) utility just to be able to participate in the future auction. An ex-ante IR auction that extracts
all of the social welfare is the following: at every stage the seller runs a second price auction, but
before that, all buyers pay an entree fee equal to their expected utility for participating (expected
value subject to being the winner, minus expected second highest value, multiplied by probability
of winning). A common difficulty in both proofs is the algebraic manipulations of the expected first
and second order statistics13. Combining with the upper bounds we get the following Theorems:
Theorem 3. For a dynamic environment where every stage distribution Xk is continuous, and has
monotone hazard rate then, even for periodic IC and ex-ante IR dynamic auctions (by combining
Claim 1 + Theorem 2): (1) The Competition Complexity is at least (e − 1)n and at most 3n; (2)
The 1
e
-approximate Competition Complexity is 1; (3) For n ≥ 2, the 13-approximate Competition
Complexity is 0.
Theorem 4. For a dynamic environment where every stage distribution Xk is continuous, the
stage distributions are independent, m − 1 stage distributions have monotone hazard rate and the
remaining stage distribution is regular, then even for periodic IC and ex-post IR dynamic auctions:
(1) The Competition Complexity is at least (e−1)n and at most 3n (For the upper bound: Lemma 1
+ Thms 1, 2); (2) The 1
e
-approximate Competition Complexity is 1 (Lemma 1 + Thms 1, 2); (3)
For n ≥ 2, the 13 -approximate Competition Complexity is 0. (Lemma 1 + Corollary 1, Thm 2)
Our lower bound for the Competition Complexity in Theorem 4 uses m− 1 MHR distributions
and one regular distribution. It remains open whether the Competition Complexity is sublinear for
the case of m independent and MHR stages.
2.6 Related Work
Dynamic Auctions. Dynamic mechanisms have been studied extensively in quite general set-
tings; see Bergemann and Said [8] for a recent survey. Many works study problems where agents
arrive and depart dynamically, e.g. Parkes and Singh [50], Pai and Vohra [48], Gershkov and
Moldovanu [30, 31], or problems with evolving private information, e.g. Courty and Hao [21],
Kakade et al. [40], Pavan et al. [51], Cavallo [15], Cavallo et al. [16], Kra¨hmer and Strausz [41].
The setting studied in this paper, where ex-post individual rationality is a hard constraint,
was first studied in Papadimitriou et al. [49]. The authors prove that computing the optimal
deterministic dynamic mechanism is NP-hard even for two stages and a single agent, as well as
very strong separations between adaptive and non-adaptive dynamic mechanisms. They also show
that the optimal randomized mechanism can be computed via an LP whose size is polynomial in
number of types and in the number of days. In this paper we are not interested in computation
and therefore use a much simpler (and much larger) Linear Program.
13The Lambert W-function makes an appearance.
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Ashlagi et al. [2] provide characterizations of the optimal ex-post IR, periodic IC dynamic
mechanism, with m independent stages and n buyers. They show that there exists an optimal
mechanism that has stage utility equal to zero for all stages, except maybe the last. As implied by
our upper bound in Lemma 1, in last stage the seller might have to pay the buyers14. Surprisingly,
their mechanism can be described via updates, at every stage, to a scalar variable that guides the
future allocation and payments. The authors use this characterization to give a mechanism that
obtains a 12 approximation to the optimal revenue for the single buyer problem.
Mirrokni et al. [43] study dynamic mechanisms with an interim IR constraint. They define a
class of mechanisms called bank account mechanisms. Bank account mechanisms maintain a state
variable, the balance, that is updated throughout the execution of the mechanism depending on a
“spending” and “depositing” policy. The allocation and payment at each stage depend on the report
and the balance. Mirrokni et al. [44] study revenue maximization for bank account mechanisms
subject to an ex-post IR constraint. Closer to this work, Mirrokni et al. [45] study the design of
oblivious dynamic mechanisms. An oblivious dynamic mechanism decides on the allocation and
payment for stage k using information only about the current and past stages, i.e. it is oblivious
about the buyers’ value distributions Dk+1, . . . ,Dm. Their mechanism ObliviousBalance runs at
each stage a combination of Myerson’s optimal auction, a second price auction, and the money
burning mechanism of Hartline and Roughgarden [38]. Their mechanism obtains a 15 approximation
to the optimal revenue. Here we can get better approximations with much simpler mechanisms,
without assuming knowledge of distributions X1, . . . ,Xk at the beginning of stage k, at the small
cost of tail assumptions like monotone hazard rate.
Bulow-Klemperer Type Results. Prior-independent mechanisms have been developed in both
single and multi-dimensional static settings, e.g. [3, 24, 34, 53]. Sivan and Syrgkanis [54] give a
version of the Bulow-Klemperer theorem for non-i.i.d. irregular distributions. For the case of
multi-unit bidders, Roughgarden et al. [52] provide a Bulow-Klemperer type result for multidimen-
sional static auctions, where the benchmark is the optimum dominant strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC) mechanism. Closer to our work, Eden et al. [27] provide a Bulow-Klemperer result for multi-
dimensional static auctions, i.e. without any loss or approximation, against the stronger benchmark
of the optimum Bayesian incentive compatible and Bayesian individual rational mechanism. They
introduce the term Competition Complexity, that we also adopt here. Their main result is that the
Competition Complexity of n buyers with additive valuations over m independent, regular items
is at most n + 2m − 2 and at least log(m). Their upper bounds on the optimal static revenue is
also via an extension of the duality framework of Cai et al. [13]. More recently, Feldman et al. [29]
also study a relaxed notion of Competition Complexity; they show that when auctioning m items
separately the 99%-Competition Complexity is O(logm), and (for regular distributions) this fur-
ther goes down to constant when auctioning the items as one bundle. A closely related line of work
considers mechanism design with limited information in the form of samples, e.g. [26, 20, 25, 46].
The Cai-Devanur-Weinberg Duality Framework, Extensions and Related Techniques.
Multiple strong duality frameworks have been developed recently, e.g. [22, 23, 33, 32], that can be
seen as an optimal transport/bipartite matching problem. Haghpanah and Hartline [35] provide an
alternative strong duality framework. Closer to the framework we extend, Carroll [14] takes a partial
14To see this most clearly, consider a single agent, two stage situation where X1 and X2 are such that E [X1] >
Mye [X1]+E [X2]; the RHS is an upper bound to the optimal revenue by Lemma 1 in this paper. The characterization
of Ashlagi et al. [2] says that there exists an optimal mechanism that extracts E [X1] in the first stage; in the second
stage the seller must pay back at least E [X1]− (Mye [X1] + E [X2])
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Lagrangian over IC and IR constraints; the application is a screening problem. As already discussed,
in this paper we present an extension of the duality framework of Cai et al. [13] for dynamic settings.
This framework was used to unify and improve the results of several recent works on Bayesian
mechanism design (e.g. [36, 42, 4, 56, 17, 18, 19] ). It was recently extended by Cai and Zhao
[12] to prove approximation results for simple mechanisms in settings with multiple subadditive
bidders, and by Brustle et al. [9] for a two-sided market setting. It was also extended in a different
way by Eden et al. [28] for a single buyer with values that exhibit a “limited complementarity”
property.
3 Warm up: One Buyer, Two Independent Stages
In this Section we prove the special case of Lemma 1 for one buyer and two stages.
Lemma 3. For single agent, two independent stages, ex-post IR and periodic IC dynamic mecha-
nisms
OPT [X , 1, 2] ≤ min {Mye [X1] + E [X2] ,E [X1] +Mye [X2]} .
3.1 The Partial Lagrangian.
The optimal dynamic auction needs to satisfy the following two types of constraints:
• Periodic incentive compatibility (PIC). At any stage k, assuming truthfulness in the future
stages, truthfully revealing vk maximizes the buyer’s expected utility, among all possible
reports vˆk. For the first stage, this constraint can be expressed as: for all v1, vˆ1 in V1
v1x1(v1)− p1(v1) + Ev2∈V2 [v2x2 (v1, v2)− p2 (v1, v2)] ≥
v1x1(vˆ1)− p1(vˆ1) + Ev2∈V2 [v2x2 (vˆ1, v2)− p2 (vˆ1, v2)] .
For the second stage: for all v1 in V1, and all v2, vˆ2 in V2
v2x2(v1, v2)− p2(v1, v2) ≥ v2x2(v1, vˆ2)− p2(v1, vˆ2).
• Ex-post individual rationality. The buyer’s stage utility is non-negative at every stage k, no
matter what the reports were in the previous stage (in the case of stage 2).
vkxk(v≤k)− pk(v≤k) ≥ 0
The revenue objective can be written as:
Ev1,v2 [p1(v1) + p2(v1, v2)]
Thus, we have the following primal program15:
15The support is discrete for simplicity of presentation.
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max
∑
v1∈V1
f(v1)p1(v1) +
∑
v1∈V1
f(v1)
∑
v2∈V2
f(v2)p2(v1, v2)
subject to:
∀v1, vˆ1 ∈ V1 : v1x1(v1)− p1(v1) +
∑
v2∈V2
f(v2) (v2x2(v1, v2)− p2(v1, v2)) ≥
v1x1(vˆ1)− p1(vˆ1) +
∑
v2∈V2
f(v2) (v2x2(vˆ1, v2)− p2(vˆ1, v2))
∀v1 ∈ V1,∀v2, vˆ2 ∈ V2 : v2x2(v1, v2)− p2(v1, v2) ≥ v2x2(v1, vˆ2)− p2(v1, vˆ2)
∀v1 ∈ V1 : v1x1(v1)− p1(v1) ≥ 0
∀v1 ∈ V1, v2 ∈ V2 : v2x2(v1, v2)− p2(v1, v2) ≥ 0
∀v1 ∈ V1 : x1(v1) ∈ [0, 1]
∀v1 ∈ V1,∀v2 ∈ V2 : x2(v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1]
We introduce a dual variable λk(v≤k, vˆk) for the periodic IC constraints for stage k and a dual
variable κk(v≤k) for the ex-post IR constraints for stage k. In other words, the dual variables
are λ1(v1, vˆ1), λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2), κ1(v1) and κ2(v1, v2). Cai et al. [13] include the IR constraints with
the IC constraints, by introducing a null type ⊥, with zero allocation and zero payment; in our
case, this is possible only for the ex-post IR constraint in the last stage. Similarly, we do not take
Lagrangian multipliers for the feasibility constraints. The partial Lagrangian L(λ, κ, x, p) of the
primal program is as follows:
L(λ, κ, x, p) =
∑
v1∈V1
f(v1)p1(v1) +
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
f(v1)f(v2)p2(v1, v2)
+
∑
v1∈V1
∑
vˆ1∈T1
λ1(v1, vˆ1) (v1x1(v1)− p1(v1)− v1x1(vˆ1) + p1(vˆ1))
+
∑
v1∈V1
∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(v1, vˆ1)
∑
v2∈V2
f2(v2) (v2x2 (v1, v2)− p2 (v1, v2)− v2x2 (vˆ1, v2) + p2 (vˆ1, v2))
+
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
∑
vˆ2∈V2
λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2) (v2x2(v1, v2)− p2(v1, v2)− v2x2(v1, vˆ2) + p2(v1, vˆ2))
+
∑
v1∈V1
κ1(v1) (v1x1(v1)− p1(v1)) +
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
κ2(v1, v2) (v2x2(v1, v2)− p2(v1, v2))
Re-grouping gives the following form:
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L(λ, κ, x, p) =
∑
v1∈V1
p1(v1)

f(v1)− κ1(v1)− ∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(v1, vˆ1) +
∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(vˆ1, v1)


+
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)

v1κ1(v1) + ∑
vˆ1∈V1
v1λ1(v1, vˆ1)−
∑
vˆ1∈V1
vˆ1λ1(vˆ1, v1)


+
∑
v1∈V1,v2∈V2
p2(v1, v2)

f(v1)f(v2)− κ2(v1, v2)− ∑
vˆ2∈V2
λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2)+
∑
vˆ2∈V2
λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2) + f(v2)

∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(vˆ1, v1)−
∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(v1, vˆ1)




+
∑
v1∈V1,v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)

v2κ2(v1, v2) + ∑
vˆ2∈V2
v2λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2)−
∑
vˆ2∈V2
vˆ2λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2)
+v2f(v2)

∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(v1, vˆ1)−
∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(vˆ1, v1)



 .
Duality theory tells us that for any choice of λ, κ ≥ 0, the primal objective OPT [X , 1, 2] is
upper bounded by maxx∈F ,pL(λ, κ, x, p), where F is the set of feasible allocations:
OPT [X , 1, 2] ≤ max
x∈F ,p
L(λ, κ, x, p) (4)
If we can find λ, κ ≥ 0 such that maxx∈F ,pL(λ, κ, x, p) is bounded, we will get non-trivial upper
bounds for OPT [X , 1, 2]. So next, we give constraints on λ and κ for this to be true. Since p1(v1)
is an unconstrained variable, if its multiplier is non-zero, setting p(v1) to ∞ or −∞ will make
L(λ, κ, x, p) unbounded. Therefore the multipliers need to satisfy:
f(v1)− κ1(v1)−
∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(v1, vˆ1) +
∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(vˆ1, v1) = 0 (5)
Similarly for the multiplier of p2(v1, v2) must be equal to 0 for maxx∈F ,pL(λ, κ, x, p) to be
bounded:
f(v1)f(v2)− κ2(v1, v2)−
∑
vˆ2∈V2
λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2) +
∑
vˆ2∈V2
λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2) + f(v2)

∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(vˆ1, v1)−
∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(v1, vˆ1)


=Eq. 5 f(v1)f(v2)− κ2(v1, v2)−
∑
vˆ2∈V2
λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2) +
∑
vˆ2∈V2
λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2) + f(v2) (κ1(v1)− f(v1))
= f(v2)κ1(v1)− κ2(v1, v2)−
∑
vˆ2∈V2
λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2) +
∑
vˆ2∈V2
λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2) = 0 (6)
Similar to Cai et al. [13] we call dual solutions that satisfy Constraints 5 and 6 useful. Useful
dual solutions can be seen as flows in a certain tree. At the top of a tree we have a source. The
nodes in the first level correspond to values in the support of the first stage; a node v1 receives flow
13
f(v1) from the source. v1 can push flow λ1(v1, v
′
1) to some other node v
′
1 on the same level, or push
flow κ1(v1) to its children. A child-node (v1, v2), or simply v2 (we explicitly say the parent when
necessary), receives incoming flow κ1(v1) · f(v2) from its parent. See Figure 1. A similar structure
is satisfied for more stages and multiple agents. We note that for correlated stages this structure
fails; the incoming flow of a child-node v2 depends on the flow pushed to and from its parent v1.
Source
v1,←
f(v1,←
)
v1
v2,←
κ 1
(v 1
) · f
(v 2
,←
)
v2
Sink
κ
2 (v
1 ,v
2 )
κ
1 (v
1 )·
f
(v
2 )
v2,→
κ
1 (v
1 ) · f(v
2,→ )
κ
1 (v
1 )
f
(v
1 )
v1,→
f(v1,→)
λ1(v1, v1,→)
λ1(v1,→, v1)
λ1(v1,←, v1)
λ1(v1, v1,←)
λ2(v1, v2, v2,→)
λ2(v1, v2,→, v2)
λ2(v1, v2,←, v2)
λ2(v1, v2, v2,←)
κ
2 (v
1 , v
2,← ) κ2(
v1
, v2
,→
)
Figure 1: Constraints of useful dual solutions form a flow.
It is possible to derive familiar expressions for the multipliers of x1 and x2. Gathering all the
terms that x1 appears in L(λ, κ, x, p), and plugging in a useful dual solution we have:
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)

v1κ1(v1) + v1 ∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(v1, vˆ1)−
∑
vˆ1∈V1
vˆ1λ1(vˆ1, v1)


=Eq. 5
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)

v1κ1(v1) + v1

f(v1)− κ1(v1) + ∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(vˆ1, v1)

− ∑
vˆ1∈V1
vˆ1λ1(vˆ1, v1)


=
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)f(v1)

v1 − 1
f(v1)
∑
vˆ1∈V1
(vˆ1 − v1)λ1(vˆ1, v1)


=
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)f(v1)Φ1(v1),
where Φ1(v1) = v1 − 1f(v1)
∑
vˆ1∈V1
(vˆ1 − v1)λ1(vˆ1, v1). Therefore, every useful dual solution induces a
“virtual value” function Φ1(.), such that the contribution of the first stage to the L(λ, κ, x, p) is
the expected virtual value. A similar structure is derived for the terms involving of x2:
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∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)

v2κ2(v1, v2) + ∑
vˆ2∈V2
v2λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2)−
∑
vˆ2∈T2
vˆ2λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2)
+v2f(v2)

∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(v1, vˆ1)−
∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(vˆ1, v1)




=Eq. 6
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)

v2f(v2)κ1(v1) + ∑
vˆ2∈V2
(v2 − vˆ2)λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2)
+v2f(v2)

∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(v1, vˆ1)−
∑
vˆ1∈V1
λ1(vˆ1, v1)




=Eq. 5
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)

v2f(v2)κ1(v1) + ∑
vˆ2∈V2
(v2 − vˆ2)λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2) + v2f(v2) (f(v1)− κ1(v1))


=
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)

v2f(v2)f(v1) + ∑
vˆ2∈V2
(v2 − vˆ2)λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2)


=
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v1)f(v2)

v2 − 1
f(v1)f(v2)
∑
vˆ2∈V2
(vˆ2 − v2)λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2)


=
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v1)f(v2)Φ2(v1, v2),
where Φ2(v1, v2) = v2 − 1f(v1)f(v2)
∑
vˆ2∈T2(vˆ2 − v2)λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2). Combining all the observations
so far, we have that given a useful dual solution λ, κ:
L(λ, κ, x, p) =
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)f(v1)Φ1(v1) +
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v1)f(v2)Φ2(v1, v2)
Therefore, given a useful dual solution λ, κ, the revenue of any dynamic mechanism M = (x, p)
that is ex-post IR and periodic IC, is at most the virtual welfare of x with respect to the virtual
value functions Φ1 and Φ2 corresponding to λ and κ. In other words,
∑
v1∈V1
f(v1)

p1(v1) + ∑
v2∈V2
f(v2)p2(v1, v2)

 ≤ ∑
v1∈V1
f(v1)

x1(v1)Φ1(v1) + ∑
v2∈V2
f(v2)x2(v1, v2)Φ2(v1, v2)

 .
3.2 Canonical Flows.
Lemma 3 is proved in two steps. First, we prove that OPT [X , 1, 2] ≤ E [X1]+Mye [X2] in Claim 2.
Then, we prove that OPT [X , 1, 2] ≤ E [X1] +Mye [X2] in Claim 3. To prove the claims, we need
the following definitions.
Definition 2. For all vik ∈ V ik define vik,→ and vik,← to be the values in V ik immediately larger and
immediately smaller than vik (respectively) :
vik,→ = inf
vˆi
k
∈V i
k
:vi
k
<vˆi
k
vˆik v
i
k,← = sup
vˆi
k
∈V i
k
:vi
k
>vˆi
k
vˆik.
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Definition 3. Myerson’s virtual value for distribution Xk is
φ(vk) = vk −
(vk,→ − vk) · Prv∼Xk [v > vk]
f(vk)
= vk −
(vk,→ − vk) · (1− F (vk))
f(vk)
.
Claim 2. For a single agent, two independent stages, ex-post IR and PIC dynamic mechanisms:
OPT [X , 1, 2] ≤ E [X1] +Mye [X2] .
Source
v1,←
f
(v
1
,←
)
f(v1,
←)
v1
v2,←
f(
v 1
) · f
(v 2
,←
)
v2
Sink
f
(v
1 )·
f
(v
2 )
v2,→
f(v
1 ) · f(v
2,→ )
f
(v
1 )
f
(v
1 )
v1,→
f
(v
1
,→
)
f(v1,→)
f(v1) · f(v2,→)f(v1) · f(v2,→)
+f(v1) · f(v2)
f(v
1 )
Figure 2: An example with support 3
of the flow with Lagrangian E [X1] +
Mye [X2].
Source
v1,←
1
f(v1,
←)
v1
v2,← v2
Sink
v2,→
κ1(v1) = 0
f
(v
1 )
v1,→
f(v1,→)
f(v1,→)f(v1,→) + f(v1)
Figure 3: An example with support 3
of the flow with Lagrangian Mye [X1] +
E [X2].
Proof. Consider the following dual solution:
κ1(v1) = f(v1) λ1(v1, vˆ1) = 0
κ2(v1, v2) =
{
f(v1) if v2 = v2
0 o.w.
λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2) =
{
f(v1)(1 − F (vˆ2)) if vˆ2 = v2,←
0 o.w.
It’s easy to verify that constraints 5 and 6 are satisfied; the solution is useful. Figure 2 illustrates
the dual solution’s corresponding flow for distributions with support 3. In the first level, a node v1
receives the flow f(v1) from the source and pushes the flow κ1(v1) = f(v1) to its children. There is
no flow between nodes in the first level as λ1(v1, vˆ1) = 0. In the second level, a child-node (v1, v2)
receives the flow κ(v1)f(v2) = f(v1)f(v2) from its parent, and the flow f(v1)(1 − F (v2)) from
(v1, v2,→). It pushes all its flow f(v1)f(v2) + f(v1)(1 − F (v2)) = f(v1)(1 − F (v2,←)) to (v1, v2,←)
or to the sink when (v1, v2,←) does not exist. These flows induce virtual values Φ1(v1) = v1 for the
first stage nodes. For the second stage nodes, Φ2(v1, v2) becomes equal to φ(v2), Myerson’s virtual
value for X2. For simplicity we assume that X2 is regular, i.e. the virtual value Φ2 induced by our
flow is monotone non-decreasing; if this is not the case we can “iron” our flow by adding loops (See
the ironing procedure in [13]). By Equation 4,
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OPT [X , 1, 2] ≤ max
x,p
L(λ, κ, x, p)
= max
x,p
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)f(v1)Φ1(v1) +
∑
v1∈V1,v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v2)f(v1)Φ2(v1, v2)
= max
x,p
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)f(v1)v1
+
∑
v1∈V1,v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v2)f(v1)

v2 − 1
f(v1)f(v2)
∑
vˆ2∈V2
(vˆ2 − v2)λ2(v1, vˆ2, v2)


= E [X1] + max
x,p
∑
v1∈V1,v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v2)f(v1)
(
v2 − 1
f(v1)f(v2)
(v2,→ − v2)f(v1) (1− F (v2))
)
= E [X1] +
∑
v1∈V1
f(v1)max
x,p
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v2)(v2 − 1− F (v2)
f(v2)
(v2,→ − v2))
= E [X1] +
∑
v1∈V1
f(v1)max
x,p
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v2)φ(v2)
= E [X1] +
∑
v1∈V1
f(v1)Mye [X2]
= E [X1] +Mye [X2]
Claim 3. For single agent, two independent stages, ex-post IR and PIC dynamic mechanisms:
OPT [X , 1, 2] ≤Mye [X1] + E [X2]
Proof. Similar to the proof of Claim 2. Start with an assignment of λ, κ:
κ1(v1) =
{
1 if v1 = v1
0 o.w.
λ1(v1, vˆ1) =
{
1− F (vˆ1) if vˆ1 = v1,←
0 o.w.
κ2(v1, v2) =
{
f(v1)f(v2) if v1 = v1
0 o.w.
λ2(v1, v2, vˆ2) = 0
It’s easy to verify that Constraints 5 and 6 are satisfied. Figure 3 illustrates the dual solution’s
corresponding flow for distributions with support 3. In the first level, a node v1 receives the
flow f(v1) from the source and the flow 1 − F (v1) from v1,→. It pushes the flow λ1(v1, v1,←) =
f(v1) + 1 − F (v1) = 1 − F (v1,←) to v1,←. If v1 = v1, v1,← does not exist for v1. Then v1 pushes
κ1(v1) = 1 to its children. In the second level, a child-node (v1, v2) receives no flow from the parent
unless v1 = v1. The child-node (v1, v2) pushes its incoming flow f(v2) to the sink. This time,
Φ1(v1) is Myerson’s virtual value and Φ2(v1, v2) = v2, for every node v2, expect the children of v1.
Note that, given κ1(v1) = 0, the every child-node under v1 has no incoming flow; therefore, it is
unavoidable for their virtual value to be equal to their value.
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OPT [X , 1, 2] ≤ max
x,p
L(λ, κ, x, p)
= max
x,p
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)f(v1)Φ1(v1) +
∑
v1∈V1,v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v2)f(v1)Φ2(v1, v2)
= max
x,p
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)f(v1)
(
v1 − 1− F (v1)
f(v1)
(v1,→ − v1)
)
+
∑
v1∈V1
∑
v2∈V2
x2(v1, v2)f(v1)f(v2)v2
= max
x,p
∑
v1∈V1
x1(v1)f(v1)φ(v1) + E [X2]
= Mye [X1] + E [X2]
Claim 2 and Claim 3 together imply Lemma 3.
4 Lower Bounding the Revenue of VCG
In this Section we prove Theorem 2. The proof is broken into three Lemmas. Recall that the
hazard rate of a distribution F is h(x) = f(x)1−F (x) . F has monotone hazard rate (MHR) if h(x) is a
non-decreasing function. We restrict ourselves to continuous distributions. For Lemma 4 we also
need the distribution to be supported on [0, V¯ ].
Lemma 4. Let Xr:n be the r-th order statistic of n i.i.d. samples from a continuous (possibly
unbounded) distribution with monotone hazard rate. Then 4n samples are necessary and sufficient
for E [X2:4n] to be at least as large as E [X1:n].
Lemma 5. Let Xr:n be the r-th (highest) order statistic of n i.i.d. samples from a continuous
(possibly unbounded) distribution with monotone hazard rate. Then E [X2:n+1] ≥ 1eE [X1:n].
Lemma 6. Let Xr:n be the r-th (highest) order statistic of n i.i.d. samples from a continuous
(possibly unbounded) distribution with monotone hazard rate. Then E [X2:n] ≥ 13E [X1:n].
A useful fact about order statistics of MHR distributions that we use throughout this Section
is that order statistics of MHR distributions have themselves an MHR distribution:
Lemma 7 (Barlow and Proschan [7]). Assume X is a random variable with distribution F and den-
sity f which is MHR. If X1,X2, . . . ,Xn, are n independent observations on X, the order statistics
formed from the Xi’s are also MHR.
We break the proof of Lemma 4 into two parts. We first prove the result for n = 1 in Subsec-
tion 4.1. We complete the proof of general n by combining the n = 1 case, Lemma 7 and a coupling
argument in Subsection 4.2. We prove Lemmas 5 and 6 (necessary for our 1
e
and 13 -approximate
Competition Complexity bounds) in Subsections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively.
4.1 Bound when n = 1
Lemma 8. Let Xr:n the r-th order statistic of n i.i.d. samples from a continuous distribution with
monotone hazard rate. Then 4 samples are necessary and sufficient for E [X2:4] to be at least as
large as E [X] = E [X1:1].
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Let H(x) =
∫ x
0 h(z)dz. If F is MHR, then H(x) is a convex function as it is the integral of a
non-decreasing function. The proofs of the next Claims can be found in Appendix D.
Claim 4. F (x) = 1− e−H(x) and E [X] = ∫ V¯0 e−H(x)dx.
Claim 5. E [X2:4] =
∫ V¯
0 3e
−4H(x) − 8e−3H(x) + 6e−2H(x)dx.
For the upper bound on the number of samples, it suffices to show that
∫ V¯
0 3e
−4H(x)−8e−3H(x)+
6e−2H(x) − e−H(x)dx ≥ 0 for all non-negative, convex and continuous functions H(x). We first
prove this statement for all non-negative, piecewise linear and convex functions Hˆ(x) in Lemma 9.
We then show how to approximate any convex function by a piecewise linear convex function in
Lemma 10. We combine Lemmas 9 and 10 to prove the upper bound in Lemma 8. The lower bound
comes from considering a (truncated) exponential distribution.
The proof of the following lemma can be found in Appendix D.
Lemma 9. Let Hˆ(x) be a non-negative, piecewise linear and convex function in [0, V¯ ], with Hˆ(0) =
0. Then
∫ V¯
0 3e
−4Hˆ(x) − 8e−3Hˆ(x) + 6e−2Hˆ(x) − e−Hˆ(x)dx > 0.
Our next step is to show that any convex function H(x) can be approximated by a piecewise
linear and convex function Hˆ(x). An elementary theorem from Real Analysis tells us that for every
continuous function f(x) in a closed interval [a, b] and every ǫ > 0, there exists a piecewise linear
function gǫ(x) such that ∀x ∈ [a, b], |f(x)− gǫ(x)| < ǫ. We show that the same is true for every
continuous and convex function f(x), ǫ > 0, where this time the approximation is by a piecewise
linear and convex function g(x)16. The proof can be found in Appendix D.
Lemma 10. For every function f(x) that is continuous and convex in a closed interval [a, b], ǫ > 0,
there exists a convex piecewise linear function gǫ(x) such that for all x ∈ [a, b]: |f(x)− gǫ(x)| < ǫ.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 8:
Proof of Lemma 8. First, we show that if there exists an unbounded distribution X that is MHR,
such that E [X2:4] − E [X1:1] = −δ′17, for some δ′ > 0, then there exists a bounded distribution Y
that is MHR, with property E [Y2:4] − E [Y1:1] = − δ′2 = −δ. We get Y by truncating X, therefore
E [Y2:4] ≤ E [X2:4]:
−δ′ = E [X2:4]− E [X1:1] ≥ E [Y2:4]− E [X1:1] .
E [X] =
∫∞
x=0 xfX(x)dx =
∫ V
x=0 xfX(x)dx +
∫∞
x=V xfX(x)dx = E [Y ] +
∫∞
x=V xfX(x)dx. From a
bound of [11], we know that
∫∞
x=V xfX(x)dx ≤ 6αmm , where αm = inf{x|FX(x) ≥ 1 − 1m}. Further-
more, again from a Lemma of [11], kαm ≥ αmk , which implies that as m→∞,
∫∞
x=V xfX(x)dx→ 0.
Therefore, we can pick an m∗ large enough, such that
∫∞
x=V xfX(x)dx is at most
δ′
2 . Combining,
we get that there exists a truncation point for X such that for the truncated distribution Y 18
E [Y2:4]− E [Y ] ≥ −δ.
Then there exists a non-negative convex and continuous function H(y) in [0,m∗] such that
I [H] =
∫ m∗
0
3e−4H(y) − 8e−3H(y) + 6e−2H(y) − e−H(y)dy = −δ,
16We don’t believe this Lemma to be new.
17We know that this difference exists because order statistics of MHR distributions are finite.
18Truncated MHR distributions are MHR.
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for some δ > 0. Let Hˆǫ(y) be a piecewise linear and convex function that ǫ-approximates H(y), as
in Lemma 10. Since I [H] is a bounded integral, we can choose ǫ small enough such that∣∣∣I [H]− I [Hˆǫ]∣∣∣ < δ.
This would imply that
∫m∗
0 3e
−4Hˆǫ(y) − 8e−3Hˆǫ(y) + 6e−2Hˆǫ(y) − e−Hˆǫ(y)dy < 0, a contradiction to
Lemma 9. Therefore, 4 samples are sufficient for E [X2:4] ≥ E [X1:1].
To see that 4 samples are also necessary, consider the second order statistic from 3 samples with
cdf F2:3 = 3F (x)
2 − 2F (x)3 and expectation E [X2:3] =
∫ V¯
0 3e
−2H(x) − 2e−3H(x)dx. An exponential
distribution with parameter λ = 1 gives E [X2:3] =
5
6 < 1 = λ = E [X] = E [X1:1], but is not
bounded. We can truncate at some large V¯ in a way that neither E [X2:4] nor E [X] change by more
than a negligible amount (truncated exponential distributions still have non-decreasing hazard
rate). Therefore, 4 samples are also necessary.
4.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We have already shown (for n = 1) that 4n samples are necessary in Lemma 8. Therefore, it
remains to show that 4n samples are sufficient. Let Y = X1:n be the maximum of n i.i.d. samples
from F . Let the Fy be the cdf of Y . If F is MHR, then so is Fy (Lemma 7).
Since Y is MHR, by Lemma 8 we have that E [Y2:4] ≥ E [Y ] = E [X1:n], where Y2:4 is the second
order statistic of 4 samples drawn from Fy. Therefore, it suffices to show that E [X2:4n] ≥ E [Y2:4]:
Draw 4n samples X1, . . . ,X4n from F . Let Z1 = max
i=1:n
Xi, Z2 = max
i=n+1:2n
Xi, Z3 = max
i=2n+1:3n
Xi and
Z4 = max
i=3n+1:4n
Xi. Y2:4 is the second largest of the Zi’s. On the other hand, X2:4n is the second
largest of the Xi’s, and therefore at least as large as Y2:4, for every single outcome.
4.3 Bounding E [X2:n+1]: Proof of Lemma 5
We are going to use the following technical lemma:
Lemma 11. Let X be a random variable from an MHR distribution D. Let X1:n be the largest
order statistic of n samples from D, and let X = Πni=1X denote the product distribution of n agents.
Then OPT [X] ≥ OPT [X1:n], i.e. the optimal revenue of n i.i.d. agent from X is larger than the
optimal revenue of one agent from X1:n.
Proof. The optimal auction M on distribution X is a second price auction with some reserve p.
The optimal auction M ′ on X1:n is a posted price auction, with some posted price p′. We can
calculate the revenue of M ′ on X1:n as follows: first draw v1, v2, . . . , vn be n i.i.d. samples from X,
i.e. a sample v from X. If the maximum of the vi’s is larger than p
′, then the revenue of M ′ on
this outcome is p′: OPT [X1:n] =
∑
v∼D Pr[v] · p′ · 1 [maxi vi ≥ p′].
Let Mˆ be a second price auction with reserve p′. If the maximum of the vi’s is larger than
p′, then the revenue of Mˆ on this outcome is the larger of p′ and the second largest vi. Therefore
Rev
[
Mˆ,X
]
≥ OPT [X1:n]. But, M is the second price auction with the optimal posted price, and
therefore OPT [X] = Rev [M,X] ≥ Rev
[
Mˆ,X
]
. The Lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 5. First, since X is a random variable from an MHR distribution D, we can lower
bound E [X2:n+1] (the revenue of a second price auction) using the original Theorem of Bulow and
Klemperer([10]):
E [X2:n+1] = Rev [Vickrey with n+ 1 i.i.d. agents from D] ≥ OPT [n i.i.d. agents from D] . (7)
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Second, by Lemma 11:
OPT [n i.i.d. agents from D] ≥ OPT [one agent from X1:n] . (8)
Third, order statistics of MHR distributions have MHR distributions themselves (Lemma 7) ,
i.e. X1:n has monotone hazard rate. Fourth, from a known result from auction theory (e.g. Hartline
[37], Lemma 5.14) we have that the optimal expected revenue from an MHR distribution is an e
approximation to the optimal expected surplus. Applying to X1:n gives:
OPT [X1:n] ≥ 1
e
E [X1:n] . (9)
Combining Equations 7, 8 and 9 gives the Lemma.
4.4 Bounding E [X2:n]: Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We need the following two Lemmas. The first Lemma is proved in [1]. The proof uses that
F2:2(x) = 1− (1−F (x))2 = 1− e−2H(x) and the fact that H(x) is convex. The second Lemma was
proved by Barlow and Proschan [6]19. We include the proofs in Appendix D.
Lemma 12. E [X1:2]− E [X2:2] ≤ 23E [X1:2].
Lemma 13. E [X1:n] − E [X2:n] = E
[
1
h(X1:n)
]
, where h(x) = f(x)1−F (x) , and thus is a non-increasing
function of n for MHR distributions.
Given the two Lemmas above, we get the desired bound on E [X2:n] as follows:
E [X1:n]− E [X2:n] ≤ E [X1:2]− E [X2:2] ≤ 2
3
E [X1:2] ≤ 2
3
E [X1:n]
5 Revenue Non-Monotonicity.
5.1 Correlation Increases Revenue
Let the first stage and second stage distributions be:
X1 =


2n+1 w.p. 12 = 2
−1
2n+2 w.p. 14 = 2
−2
2n+3 w.p. 2−3
. . .
2n+(n−1) = 22n−1 w.p. 2−(n−1)
22n w.p. 2−n
22n+1 w.p. 2−n
X2 =


2n+1 w.p. 12 = 2
−1
2n w.p. 14 = 2
−2
2n−1 w.p. 2−3
. . .
2n+1−(n−1) = 8 w.p. 2−(n−1)
2n+1−(n−1) = 4 w.p. 2−n
2n+1−n = 2 w.p. 2−n
X1 is an equal revenue distribution and therefore Mye [X1] = 2
n+1 (from setting any price). Also:
E [X2] = 2
n+1 · 12 + 2n · 14 + 2n−1 · 2−3 + · · ·+ 23 · 2−(n−1) + 22 · 2−n + 2 · 2−n
= 2n + 2n−2 + 2n−4 + 2n−6 + · · · + 2−n+4 + 2−n+2 + 2−n+1
= 2−n+1 +
∑n
i=1 2
n+2−2i
= 2−n+1 + 13 · 2−n+2 · (22n − 1)
= 23
(
2−n + 2n+1
)
19Also see Szech [55]
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Therefore, the revenue of the optimal auction for independent X1 and X2 is at most:
Mye [X1] + E [X2] = 2
n+1 + 23
(
2−n + 2n+1
)
= 2n+1 + 432
n + 232
−n.
Next we consider correlated X1 and X2, while keeping the marginals for each stage the same,
and show an auction with revenue strictly larger than 2n+1 + 432
n + 232
−n. The correlation is as
follows: If the value on the first stage is 2n+1 then the value on the second stage is 2n+1 with
probability 1. Otherwise, if the first stage value is 2n+i for i = 2, . . . , n+1, the value on the second
stage is 2n+2−i with probability 1 (2n+2 maps to 2n, 2n+3 maps to 2n−1 and so on).
Consider the auction that in the first stage offers two options: (1) Pay 2n and get the first day
item with probability 12 . The second stage item will cost 2
n+1; (2) Pay 2n+2 and get the first day
item with probability 1. The second stage item will be free.
The buyer with first stage value 2n+1 will buy the first option. Everyone else will buy the second
option. The total revenue is 12 ·
(
2n + 2n+1
)
+ 12 · 2n+2 = 2n−1 + 2n + 2n+1, which is larger than
2n+1 + 432
n + 232
−n for all n ≥ 2.
5.2 Correlation Decreases Revenue
Let the first stage and second stage distributions be:
X1 =


1 w.p. 12 = 2
−1
2 w.p. 14 = 2
−2
3 w.p. 2−3
. . .
n− 1 w.p. 2−(n−1)
n w.p. 2−n
n+ 1 w.p. 2−n
X2 =


2 w.p. 12 = 2
−1
22 w.p. 14 = 2
−2
23 w.p. 2−3
. . .
2n−1 w.p. 2−(n−1)
2n w.p. 2−n
2n+1 w.p. 2−n
If X1 and X2 are independent, the optimal auction extracts revenue equal to E [X1]+Mye [X2].
X2 is an equal revenue distribution, so, as we’ve already seen, Mye [X2] = 2 and is achieved by
setting any price p. Another interesting property of X2 is that even though setting different prices
p has the same revenue for the seller, the result is different expected utilities for the buyer. For
example, setting p = 2 gives expected utility for the buyer E [X2]− 2 = n, setting price p = 4 gives
expected utility
∑
v≥4 Pr[X2 = v] (v − 4) = n− 1, setting price p = 23 gives expected utility n− 2,
and so on. The following auction is truthful (in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium) and ex-post IR: On
the first stage the price is equal to the reported value vˆ. For a reported value vˆ the second stage
item will have a posted price p that results in expected utility vˆ − 1. Observe that reporting value
vˆ gives utility v − vˆ for the first stage, and utility vˆ − 1 for the second stage, i.e. overall utility
v − 1. The revenue of this auction is E [X1] +Mye [X2] > 3.
Now, we keep the marginal distributions of X1 and X2 the same, but make them correlated in
the following way: if X1 = i, then X2 = 2
i. We show that the expected revenue of the optimal
auction in this case is exactly 3. Showing it is at least 3 is straightforward: consider the auction
that posts a price of 1 on the first stage and a price of 2 on the second stage. In order to show that
the revenue is at most 3 we apply our duality framework for the case of correlated stages.
At the first stage we push the Myerson type flow (Claim 2, Section 3). Namely, each node
v1 pushes all its incoming flows to its immediate successor v1,← = v1 − 1, i.e. λ1(v1, v1,←) =
1 − F1(v1,←). This flow makes the expected virtual value at stage one equal Mye [X1] = 1 by an
argument in Claim 2 in Section 3. κ1(v1) = 0, but for correlated stages it can still be the case
that a node (v1, v2) in the second stage (a node v2 with history/parent v1) can still have positive
22
incoming flow. In fact, for our choice of λ1, and the specific correlation of our example, the incoming
“default” flow to a node v2 = 2
v1,→ under parent node v1 is equal to λ1(v1,→, v1), the amount of
flow v1,→ pushes to v1 in the first stage (See the flow conservation constraints for correlated stages
in Appendix B). To satisfy the flow conservation constraints we push λ1(v1,→, v1) = 1 − F1(v1)
unit of flow from node v2,→ = 2v1,→ to node v2, under parent node v1, i.e. λ2(v1, 2v1,→ , 2v1) =
1 − F1(v1) = 1 − F2(2v1). Since f(v2|v1) = 0, unless v2 = 2v1 , the only second stage node that
contributes to the objective is the one with the incoming flow (and lower virtual value Φ2).
Ev2 [Φ2(v1, v2)|v1] = Φ2(v1, 2v1) = 2v1 −
1− F (v1)
f(v1)
(2v1+1 − 2v1) = 2v1 − (2v1+1 − 2v1) = 0,
for all v1, except for v¯1 = n+1 (the highest value in the support), whose corresponding second stage
value v¯2 = 2
n+1 does not have incoming flows; v¯2,→ is not defined. In this case Φ2(v¯1, v¯2) = v¯2.
Thus, the expected virtual value of the second stage comes exclusively from the virtual value of v¯2:
Ev1,v2 [Φ2(v1, v2)] = f(v¯1)Ev2 [Φ2(v¯1, v2)|v¯2] = f(v¯1)f(v¯2|v¯1)Φ2(v¯1, v¯2) = 2−n × 2n+1 = 2.
The primal objective of revenue is upper bounded by maxx∈F ,pL(λ, κ, x, p), which in our case
is at most Ev1 [Φ1(v1)] +Ev1,v2 [Φ2(v1, v2)] = 1+ 2 = 3, since that is the maximum dual value under
the flow described in the previous paragraph.
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A Revenue Upper Bounds for n Buyers and m Independent Stages
In this Section we prove Lemma 1, using an approach similar to the previous Section.
A.1 The Partial Lagrangian.
The optimal dynamic mechanism needs to satisfy the following two types of constraints:
• Periodic incentive compatibility (PIC). At any stage k for every buyer i, assuming truthfulness
in all future stages, revealing the true value vik maximizes the buyer’s expected utility among
all possible values vˆik. For stage k and buyer i, this constraint can be expressed as: for all
v≤k−1 in Vk−1:
E
v
−i
k

vikxik(v−i≤k, vi≤k)− pik(v−i≤k, vi≤k) + Ev−i
k+1:m,v
i
k+1:m

∑
j>k
vijx
i
j(v
−i
≤j , v
i
≤j)− pij(v−i≤j , vi≤j)




≥ E
v
−i
k

vikxik(v−i≤k, vi<k, vˆik)− pik(v−i≤k, vi<k, vˆik)+
E
v
−i
k+1:m,v
i
k+1:m

∑
j>k
vijx
i
j(v
−i
≤j , v
i
<k, vˆ
i
k, v
i
k+1:j)− pij(v−i≤j , vi<k, vˆik, vik+1:j)




• Ex-post individual rationality. At any stage k, the stage utility of every buyer i is non-negative
regardless of the reports from previous stages. For all v≤k in V≤k:
vikx
i
k(v≤k)− pik(v≤k) ≥ 0 (10)
As noted in Ashlagi et al. [2], the following constraints are equivalent to Constrains 10: for
all v≤k−1 in Vk−1, and vik in Vk
E
v
−i
k
[vikx
i
k(v≤k)− pik(v≤k)] ≥ 0 (11)
Any xik, p
i
k satisfying Constraint 10 naturally satisfy Constraint 11; on the other hand, for
any auction M with xik, p
i
k satisfying 11, there exists another auction Mˆ defined as:
pˆik(v≤k) =
E
v
−i
k
[pik(v≤k)]
E
v
−i
k
[xik(v≤k)]
xˆik(v≤k) =
{
1 if item k is allocated to buyer i in M
0 o.w.
It’s easy to verify that xˆik, pˆ
i
k satisfy Constraint 10 and Rev
[
Mˆ,X , n,m
]
= Rev [M,X , n,m].
We use Constraints 11 for the primal program.
Thereby, we obtain the following primal program:
27
max
m∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
∑
v≤k
f(v≤k)pik(v≤k)
subject to:
∀i = 1, . . . , n,∀k = 1, . . . m,∀v≤k−1 ∈ Vk−1, vik, vˆik ∈ Vk :∑
v
−i
k
f(v−ik )
(
vikx
i
k(v
−i
≤k, v
i
≤k)− pik(v−i≤k, vi≤k) +
∑
vk+1:m
f(vk+1:m)
(∑
j>k v
i
jx
i
j(v
−i
≤j , v
i
≤j)− pij(v−i≤j , vi≤j)
))
≥∑
v
−i
k
f(v−ik )
(
vikx
i
k(v
−i
≤k, v
i
<k, vˆ
i
k)− pik(v−i≤k, vi<k, vˆik)
+
∑
vk+1:m
f(vk+1:m)
(∑
j>k v
i
jx
i
j(v
−i
≤j , v
i
<k, vˆ
i
k, v
i
k+1:j)− pij(v−i≤j , vi<k, vˆik, vik+1:j)
))
∀k = 1, . . . ,m,∀v≤k−1 ∈ Vk−1, vik ∈ Vk :∑
v
−i
k
f(v−ik )
(
vikx
i
k(v≤k)− pik(v≤k)
) ≥ 0
∀i = 1, . . . , n∀k = 1, . . . ,m,∀v≤k ∈ Vk : xik(v≤k) ∈ [0, 1]
∀k = 1, . . . ,m,∀v≤k ∈ Vk :
n∑
i=1
xik(v≤k) ≤ 1
We introduce a Lagrangian multiplier λk(v<k, v
i
k, vˆ
i
k) for each periodic IC constraint and κk(v<k, v
i
k)
for each ex-post IR constraint. The partial Lagrangian, after re-grouping the terms, is the following:
L(λ, κ, x, p) =
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
pik(v≤t)

f(v≤k)− f(v−ik )κk(v<k, vik) + f(v−ik )∑
vˆi
k
(λk(v<k, vˆ
i
k, v
i
k)
−λk(v<k, vik, vˆik)) +
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆij
f(v−ij ,vj+1:k)(λj(v<j , vˆ
i
j , v
i
j)− λj(v<j , vij , vˆij))

+
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
xik(v≤k)

vikf(v−ik )κk(v<k, vik) + f(v−ik )∑
vˆi
k
(vikλk(v<k, v
i
k, vˆ
i
k)
−vˆikλk(v<k, vˆik, vik)) +
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆij
f(v−ij ,vj+1:k)(v
i
kλj(v<j , v
i
j , vˆ
i
j)− vikλj(v<j , vˆij , vij))


Duality theory tells us for any λ, κ ≥ 0, the primal objective is upper bounded by maxx∈F ,pL(λ, κ, x, p),
where F is the set of possible allocations:
OPT [X , n,m] ≤ max
x∈F ,p
L(λ, κ, x, p) (12)
upper bounds the primal objective. If we want to find non-trivial upper bounds, we need to ensure
that maxx∈F ,p L(λ, κ, x, p) is bounded. This requires that the free variables pik(v≤k) have multipliers
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equal to zero. Therefore: for stage k, buyer i and reports v≤k in Vk
f(v≤k)− f(v−ik )κk(v<k, vik) + f(v−ik )
∑
vˆi
k
(λk(v<k, vˆ
i
k, v
i
k)− λk(v<k, vik, vˆik))
+
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆij
f(v−ij ,vj+1:k)(λj(v<j , vˆ
i
j , v
i
j)− λj(v<j , vij , vˆij)) = 0 (13)
Noticing the recursive structure of Equation 13, we take the constraint for stage k − 1, buyer i
and reports v≤k−1 in Vk−1:
f(v≤k−1)− f(v−ik−1)κk−1(v<k−1, vik−1) + f(v−ik−1)
∑
vˆi
k−1
(λk−1(v<k−1, vˆik−1, v
i
k−1)
− λk−1(v<k−1, vik−1, vˆik−1)) +
k−2∑
j=1
∑
vˆij
f(v−ij ,vj+1:k−1)(λj(v<j , vˆ
i
j , v
i
j)− λj(v<j , vij , vˆij)) = 0 (14)
Simplify the LHS of Equation 13 with Equation 14:
0 = f(v≤k)− f(v−ik )κ(v<k, vik) + f(v−ik )
∑
vˆi
k
(λk(v<k, vˆ
i
k, v
i
k)− λk(v<k, vik, vˆik))
+
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆij
f(v−ij ,vj+1:k)(λj(v<j , vˆ
i
j , v
i
j)− λj(v<j , vij , vˆij))
=Eq. 14 f(v≤k)− f(v−ik )κ(v<k, vik) + f(v−ik )
∑
vˆi
k
(λk(v<k, vˆ
i
k, v
i
k)− λk(v<k, vik, vˆik))
+ f(vk)(f(v
−i
k−1)κk−1(v<k−1, v
i
k−1)− f(v≤k−1))
= f(v−ik−1,vk)κk−1(v<k−1, v
i
k−1)− f(v−ik )κk(v<k, vik)
+ f(v−ik )
∑
vˆi
k
(λk(v<k, vˆ
i
k, v
i
k)− λk(v<k, vik, vˆik)) = 0
Since the last line equals zero, we obtain:
f(v−ik−1,vk)κk−1(v<k−1, v
i
k−1)− f(v−ik )κk(v<k, vik) =
f(v−ik )
∑
vˆi
k
(λk(v<k, v
i
k, vˆ
i
k)− λk(v<k, vˆik, vik)) (15)
Recall that we call solutions of λ, κ ≥ 0 that satisfy Equation 13 useful solutions. Then, given
a set of useful λ, κ we can simplify L(λ, κ, p, x) using Equations 13, 14 and 15. Gather all the terms
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in L(λ, κ, x, p) that involve xik for k > 1 and simplify the terms using Equation 15:
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=2
∑
v≤k
xik(v≤k)

vikf(v−ik )κk(v<k, vik) + f(v−ik )∑
vˆi
k
(vikλk(v<k, v
i
k, vˆ
i
k)− vˆikλk(v<k, vˆik, vik))
+ vik
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆij
f(v−ij ,vj+1:k)(λj(v<j , v
i
j , vˆ
i
j)− λj(v<j , vˆij , vij))


=Eq. 15
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=2
∑
v≤k
xik(v≤k)

vikf(v−ik )κk(v<k, vik) + f(v−ik )∑
vˆi
k
(vikλk(v<k, v
i
k, vˆ
i
k)− vˆikλk(v<k, vˆik, vik))
− vikf(vk)(f(v−ik−1)κk−1(v<k−1, vik−1)− f(v≤k−1))


=
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=2
∑
v≤k
xik(v≤k)

vikf(v≤k−1)f(vk)− f(v−ik )∑
vˆi
k
(vˆik − vik)λk(v<k, vˆik, vik)


=
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=2
∑
v≤k
xikf(v≤k)(v≤k)

vik − 1f(v≤k−1, vik)
∑
vˆi
k
(vˆik − vik)λk(v<k, vˆik, vik)


=
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=2
∑
v≤k
xikf(v≤k)Φk(v≤k)
where Φik(v≤k) = v
i
k − 1f(v≤k−1,vik)
∑
vˆi
k
(vˆik − vik)λk(v<k, vˆik, vik). Finally, simplify the terms
involving xi1(v1) using Equation 13 evaluated at k = 1:
n∑
i=1
∑
v1
xi1(v1)

vi1f(v−i1 )κ1(vi1) + f(v−i1 )∑
vˆi1
(vi1λ1(v
i
1, vˆ
i
1)− vˆi1λ1(vˆi1, vi1))


=Eq. 13
n∑
i=1
∑
v1
xi1(v1)

vi1f(v1)− f(v−i1 )∑
vˆi1
(vˆi1 − vi1)λ1(vˆi1, vi1)


=
n∑
i=1
∑
v1
xi1(v1)f(v1)

vi1 − 1f(vi1)
∑
vˆi1
(vˆi1 − vi1)λ1(vˆi1, vi1)


=
n∑
i=1
∑
v1
xi1(v1)f(v1)Φ1(v1)
where Φi1(v1) = v
i
1 − 1f(vi1)
∑
vˆi1
(vˆi1 − vi1)λ1(vˆi1, vi1).
Combining all the observations so far, we have that given any useful solution λ, κ:
L(λ, κ, x, p) =
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
xik(v≤k)f(v≤k)Φ
i
k(v≤k)
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A.2 Main Claim
Claim 6. For n agents, m independent stages, ex-post IR and PIC dynamic mechanisms
OPT [X , n,m] ≤Mye [Xj ] +
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
E [(Xk)1:n]
for any j = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. Consider the following dual solution:
κk(v<k, v
i
k) =


f(v<k, v
i
k) k < j
f(v<k,v
i
k
)
f(vij)
k ≥ j ∧ vij = vij
0 o.w.
λk(v<k, v
i
k, vˆ
i
k) =
{
f(v<k)(1 − F (vˆik)) k = j ∧ vˆik = vik,←
Dfn 2
0 o.w.
It’s easy to verify that Constraint 13 is satisfied. These flows induce virtual value Φik(vk) = v
i
k
for all k 6= j. For stage j, Φij(v≤j) becomes φ(vij), Myerson’s virtual value for Xj. For simplicity
we assume that Xj is regular, so that the virtual values induced are non-decreasing; if this is not
the case, we use an “ironing” procedure to the flow λj in stage j, similar to [13].
Then by Inequality 12:
OPT [X , n,m] ≤ max
x,p
L(λ, κ, x, p)
= max
x,p
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
f(v≤k)xik(v≤k)Φ
i
k(v≤k)
=Dnf 2 max
x,p
n∑
i=1
∑
v≤j
f(v≤j)xij(v≤j)
(
vij −
1
f(vij,v<j)
(vij,→ − vij)f(v<j)(1− F (vij))
)
+
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
∑
v≤k
f(v≤k)vik
=Dnf 3 max
x,p
∑
v<j
f(v<j)
∑
vj
f(vj)
n∑
i=1
xij(v≤j)φ(v
i
j) +
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
E [(Xk)1:n]
=
∑
v<j
f(v<j)max
x,p
∑
vj
f(vj)xj(v≤j)φ(vj) +
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
E [(Xk)1:n]
= Mye [Xj] +
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
E [(Xk)1:n]
B Correlated stages with a stochastic dominance structure
We prove a simliar result to Lemma 1 under a certain stochastic dominance condition.
Lemma 14. For one agent, m correlated stages, ex-post IR and PIC dynamic mechanisms
OPT [X , 1,m] ≤ min
j=1,...,m

E [Mye [Xj |X<j ]] +
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
E [Xk]


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if for any stage k, and any two histories v<k, v
′
<k that satisfy ∀t < k, vt ≥ v′t, the conditional
distribution Xk|v<k stochastically dominates the conditional distribution Xk|v′<k.
The proof uses the duality framework. First we construct the revenue maximizing LP, with the
objective being the expected revenue and the constraints enforcing PIC and ex-post IR. We get a
partial Lagrangian L(λ, κ, x, p), and by duality:
OPT [X , 1,m] ≤ max
x,p
L(λ, κ, x, p) where λ, κ ≥ 0.
Then for each stage j we provide a feasible assignment of λ, κ such that
max
x,p
L(λ, κ, x, p) ≤ E [Mye [Xj |X<j ]] +
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
E [Xk] .
The Primal.
max
m∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
f(v≤k)pk(v≤k)
subject to:
∀k = 1, . . . ,m, v<k, vk, vˆk :
vkxk(v<k, vk)− pk(v<k, vk) +
∑
vk+1:m
f(vk+1:m|v≤k)
m∑
j>k
(vjxj(v≤k, vk+1:j)− pj(v≤k, vk+1:j)) ≥
vkxk(v<k, vˆk)− pk(v<k, vˆk) +
∑
vk+1:m
f(vk+1:m|v≤k)
m∑
j>k
(vjxj(v<k−1, vˆk, vk+1:j)− pt(v<k−1, vˆk, vk+1:j))
∀k = 1, . . . ,m, v<k, vk, vˆk :
vkxk(v≤k)− pk(v≤k) ≥ 0
The partial Lagrangian.
Introduce a lagrangian multiplier λk(v<k, vk, vˆk) for each periodic IC constraint and κk(v<k, vk) for
each ex-post IR constraint. Then lagrangify the primal program to obtain the following partial
dual,
L(λ, κ, x, p) =
m∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
pk(v≤k)

f(v≤k)− κk(v≤k) +∑
vˆk
(λk(v<k, vˆk, vk)− λk(v≤k, vˆk))
+
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
(f(vj+1:k|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j vˆj, vj)− f(vj+1:k|v≤j)λj(v≤j , vˆj))

+
m∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
xk(v≤k)

vkκk(v<k, vk) +∑
vˆk
(vkλk(v<k, vk, vˆk)− vˆkλk(v<k, vˆk, vk))
+
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
vk(f(vj+1:k|v≤j)λj(v≤j , vˆj)− f(vj+1:k|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j , vˆj , vj))


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Since pk(v≤k) is an unconstrained variable, for the upper bound maxx,p L(λ, κ, x, p) to be
bounded, the multipliers of pk(v≤k) must equal to zero. As a result, λ and κ form a “flow”
that obeys the following flow conservation constraints: ∀k = 1, . . . m, v≤k:
f(v≤k)− κk(v≤k) +
∑
vˆj
(λk(v<kvˆk, vk)− λk(v≤k, vˆk))
+
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
(f(vj+1:k|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j vˆj, vj)− f(vj+1:k|v≤j)λj(v≤j , vˆj))) = 0 (16)
The flow conservation constraints for pk−1(v≤k−1) give:
−
∑
vˆk−1
λk−1(v≤k−1, vˆk−1)−
k−2∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
f(vj+1:k−1|v≤j)λj(v≤j , vˆj)
= −
∑
vˆk−1
λk−1(v<k−1vˆk−1, vk−1)−
k−2∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
f(vj+1:k−1|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j vˆj , vj)+κk−1(v≤k−1)−f(v≤k−1)
(17)
Note the recursive structure in the mutlipliers of pk(v≤k). In L(λ, κ, x, p), in the terms containing
pk(v≤k), we can substitute the LHS of 17 with the RHS of 17:
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pk(v≤k)

f(v≤k)− κk(v≤k) +∑
vˆk
(λk(v<kvˆk, vk)− λk(v≤k, vˆk))
+
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
f(vj+1:k|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j vˆj , vj)−
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
f(vj+1:k|v≤j)λj(v≤j , vˆj)


= pk(v≤k)

f(v≤k)− κk(v≤k) +∑
vˆk
(λk(v<kvˆk, vk)− λk(v≤k, vˆk)) +
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
f(vj+1:k|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j vˆj , vj)
+f(vj+1:k|v≤k−1)(−
∑
vˆk−1
λk−1(v≤k−1, vˆk−1)−
k−2∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
f(vj+1:k−1|v≤j)λj(v≤j , vˆj))


= pk(v≤k)

f(v≤k)− κk(v≤k) +∑
vˆk
(λk(v<kvˆk, vk)− λk(v≤k, vˆk)) +
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
f(vj+1:k|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j vˆj , vj)
+f(vk|v≤k−1)κk−1(v≤k−1)− f(vk|v≤k−1)f(v≤k−1)− f(vk|v≤k−1)
∑
vˆk−1
λk−1(v<k−1vˆk−1, vk−1)
−f(vk|v≤k−1)
k−2∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
f(vj+1:k−1|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j vˆj , vj)


= pk(v≤k)

f(vk|v≤k−1)κk−1(v≤k−1)− κk(v≤k) +∑
vˆk
(λk(v<kvˆk, vk)− λk(v≤k, vˆk))
+
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
(f(vk|v<j , vˆj , vj+1:k−1)− f(vk|v≤k−1))f(vj+1:k−1|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j vˆj, vj)


Then, by the conservation constraints of pk(v≤k),
∑k−1
j=1
∑
vˆj
(f(vj+1:k|v≤j)λj(v≤j, vˆj)− f(vj+1:k|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j, vˆj , vj))
= f(v≤k)− κk(v≤k) +
∑
vˆk
(λk(v<k, vˆk, vk)− λk(v≤k, vˆk)) (18)
Similarly, in L(λ, κ, x, p) in the terms containing xk(v≤k), substitute the LHS of 18 with the
RHS of 18 , we obtain
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xk(v≤k)

vkκk(v<k, vk) +∑
vˆk
(vkλk(v<k, vk, vˆk)− vˆkλk(v<k, vˆk, vk))
+vk
k−1∑
j=1
∑
vˆj
(f(vj+1:k|v≤j)λj(v≤j , vˆj)− f(vj+1:k|v<j vˆj)λj(v<j , vˆj , vj))


= xk(v≤k)

vkκk(v<k, vk) +∑
vˆk
(vkλk(v<k, vk, vˆk)− vˆkλk(v<k, vˆk, vk))
+vk(f(v≤k)− κk(v≤k) +
∑
vˆk
(λk(v<k, vˆk, vk)− λk(v≤k, vˆk))


= xk(v≤k)f(v≤k)

vk − 1
f(v≤k)
∑
vˆk
(vˆk − vk)λk(v<k, vˆk, vk)


Now L(λ, κ, x, p) can be simplified as:
L(λ, κ, x, p) =∑mk=1∑v≤k xk(v≤k)
(
vkf(v≤k)−
∑
vˆk
(vˆk − vk)λk(v<kvˆk, vk)
)
For any stage j, the following assignment satisfies all the flow conservation constraints:
κk(v<k, vk) =
{
k ≥ j ∧ ∀t = j, . . . , k − 1, vt = vt : f(v<j)f(vk|v<k)
o.w. : 0
λk(v<k, vk, vˆk) =


k < j : 0
k = j ∧ vˆk = vk,← : f(v<k)(1− F (vˆk|v<k))
k > j ∧ vˆk = vk,←
∧∀t = j, . . . , k − 1, vt = vt :
∑
v′
k
≥vk
k−1∑
t=j
(f(v′k|v<t, vt,→, vt+1:k−1)− f(v′k|v≤k−1))×
f(vt+1:k−1|v<t, vt,→)λt(v<t, vt,→, vt)+
f(v<j)(1− F (vˆk|v<k))
k > j ∧ vˆk = vk,←
∧∃t = j, . . . , k − 1, vt 6= vt :
∑
v′
k
≥vk
k−1∑
t=j
(f(v′k|v<t, vt,→, vt+1:k−1)− f(v′k|v≤k−1))×
f(vt+1:k−1|v<t, vt,→)λt(v<t, vt,→, vt)
o.w. : f(v≤k)
It’s easy to see that all κk and all λk that fall into the first or last cases are non-negative. We
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need to verify that the flows λk(v<k, vk, vk,←) for k > j have non-negative values:
λk(v<k, vk, vk,←) ≥
∑
v′
k
≥vk
k−1∑
t=j
(
f(v′k|v<t, vt,→, vt+1:k−1)− f(v′k|v≤k−1)
)
f(vt+1:k−1|v<t, vt,→)λt(v<t, vt,→, vt)
=
k−1∑
t=j
f(vt+1:k−1|v<t, vt,→)λt(v<t, vt,→, vt)×
∑
v′
k
≥vk
(f(v′k|v<t, vt,→, vt+1:k−1)− f(v′k|v≤k−1))
=
k−1∑
t=j
f(vt+1:k−1|v<t, vt,→)λt(v<t, vt,→, vt) (F (vk,←|v<k)− F (vk,←|v<t, vt,→, vt+1:k−1)) .
By the stochastic dominance structure, since the two histories only differ in stage t, and vt <
vt,→, Xk|v<t, vt,→, vt+1:k−1 stochastically dominates Xk|v<k. As a result,
F (vk,←|v<k)− F (vk,←|v<t, vt,→, vt+1:k−1) ≥ 0,
and therefore λk(v<k, vk, vk,←) ≥ 0. Plugging this assignment of λ and κ to the dual expression
gives:
OPT [X , 1,m] ≤max
x,p
L(λ, κ, x, p)
=max
x,p
m∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
pk(v≤k)× 0 +
m∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
f(v≤k)xk(v≤k)

vk − 1
f(v≤k)
∑
vˆk
(vˆk − vk)λk(v<kvˆk, vk)


=
j−1∑
k=1
∑
v≤k
f(v≤k)xk(v≤k)vk+
∑
v≤j
f(v≤j)x∗j (v≤j)[vj −
1
f(v≤j)
(vj,→ − vj)f(v<j)(1− F (vj |v<j))]+
m∑
k=j+1
∑
v≤k
f(v≤k)x∗k(v≤k)
(
vk − 1
f(v≤k)
(vk,→ − vk)λk(v<k, vk,→, vk)
)
≤max
x,p
∑
v≤j
f(v≤j)xj(v≤j)
(
vj − 1− F (vj |v<j)
f(vj|v<j) (vj,→ − vj)
)
+
j−1∑
k=1
E [Xk] +
m∑
k=j+1
E [Xk]
=max
x,p
∑
v<j
f(v<j)
∑
vj
f(vj|v<j)xj(v≤j)
(
vj − 1− F (vj |v<j)
f(vj|v<j) (vj,→ − vj)
)
+
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
E [Xk]
=E [Mye [Xj |X<j ]] +
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
E [Xk]
This upper bound holds for all j = 1, . . . ,m; Lemma 14 is implied.
C Lower Bounds on The Competition Complexity
Lemma 15. For independent stages, m − 1 MHR and 1 regular stage, and ex-post IR auctions,
the Competition Complexity is at least (e− 1)n, even for auctions that are incentive compatible in
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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Proof. For the first m − 1 stages, let the value distributions be X = Exp(1, V ) is an exponential
distribution with parameter λ = 1, truncated at some large value V 20. The value distribution
Y for the last stage is an equal revenue distribution truncated at some large value Vˆ 21, with
Fy(x) = 1− 1x .The following auction is IC in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and ex-post IR:
• In the first m − 1 stages run a first price auction: the winner is the buyer with the highest
value with a payment equal to that value.
• In the last stage, the item is given for free to buyer i, with probability equal to
∑m−1
k=1 p
i
k
E[Y ] , where
pik is the price payed by agent i in stage k. In other words, every buyer i wins by bidding v,
the probability that she gets the last stage item is increased by v
E[Y ] .
The revenue of this auction is
(m− 1) · E [X1:n] . (19)
Claim 7. The revenue of VCG at every stage with c additional buyers is at most
(m− 1) · E [X2:n+c] + E [Y2:n+c] ≤ (m− 1) · E [X2:n+c] + n+ c. (20)
Proof. For simplicity we show the proof for an untruncated equal revenue distribution Y . F2:n+c(y) =
Fn+c(y)+(n+c)Fn+c−1(y) (1− F (y)) =
(
1− 1
y
)n+c
+(n+c)
(
1− 1
y
)n+c−1
1
y
=
(
y−1
y
)n+c (
1− n+c1−y
)
.
Therefore, E [Y2:n+c] =
∫∞
1 1−
(
y−1
y
)n+c (
1− n+c1−y
)
dy. The antiderivative of 1−
(
y−1
y
)n+c (
1− n+c1−y
)
is y
(
1−
(
y−1
y
)n+c)
. Therefore:
E [Y2:n+c] =
∫ ∞
1
1−
(
y − 1
y
)n+c(
1− n+ c
1− y
)
dy
=
[
y
(
1−
(
y − 1
y
)n+c)]∞
1
=
(
lim
y→∞
yn+c − (y − 1)n+c
yn+c−1
)
− 1
= n+ c− 1
So 20 holds.
We want to find the smallest c such that right-hand side of 20 is at least 19. For simplicity we
compute the expected order statistics of X as if it is an untruncated exponential distribution. We
can pick V large enough such that the conclusion is the same.
For an exponential distribution Z ∼ Exp(1) we have that E [Z1:n] =
∑n
i=1
1
i
= Hn and E [Z2:n] =∑n
i=2
1
i
= Hn − 1, where Hn is the n-th harmonic number. For large n, Hn can be approximated
20Truncated exponential distributions have monotone hazard rate.
21 Y has revenue 1 for a single agent, and expectation ln
(
Vˆ
)
.
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by lnn. Therefore, expression 20 being at least expression 19 is equivalent to :
(m− 1) · E [X2:n+c] + n+ c > (m− 1) · E [X1:n]
(m− 1) · (Hn+c − 1) + n+ c > (m− 1) ·Hn
Hn+c −Hn + n+ c
m− 1 > 1
ln
(
n+ c
n
)
+
n+ c
m− 1 > 1
(n + c)e
n+c
m−1 > ne
n+ c
m− 1e
n+c
m−1 >
ne
m− 1
n+ c
m− 1 > W
(
ne
m− 1
)
c > (m− 1) ·W
(
ne
m− 1
)
− n
where W is the Lambert function. limk→∞ kW (enk ) = en, therefore c > (e− 1)n.
Lemma 16. For m MHR stages, and ex-ante IR auctions, the Competition Complexity is at least
(e − 1)n, even for independent stages and for auctions that are incentive compatible in a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. For the first stage, X1 is uniform [0, ǫ] for some small ǫ > 0. For k = 2, . . . ,m, Xk =
Exp(1, V ) is an exponential distribution with parameter λ = 1, truncated at some large V .
We describe an ex-ante IR auction that is incentive compatible in a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium, with revenue
∑m
k=2 E [(Xk)1:n], i.e. essentially the social welfare: on stages 2 through m
the auctioneer will run a second price auction, extracting revenue
∑m
k=2 E [(Xk)2:n]. The extra∑m
k=2 (E [(Xk)1:n]− E [(Xk)2:n]) will be charged upfront; in stage 1 every buyer is offered the op-
tion to pay 1
n
∑m
k=2 (E [(Xk)1:n]− E [(Xk)2:n]) in order to participate in stages 2 through k. This is
equal to the expected utility of each buyer, and therefore, since they are expectation maximizers,
they will accept the offer.
Given this auction, the calculation for lower bounding the Competition Complexity is almost
identical (in fact much simpler) to Lemma 15.
D Proofs missing from Section 4
Proof of Claim 4. d
dx
log (1− F (x)) = −f(x)1−F (x) = −h(x). Therefore, 1 − F (x) = e−
∫ x
0
h(z)dz . Re-
arranging proves the first part of the claim. We get the second part from the definition of expectation
for non-negative random variables.
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Proof of Claim 5.
E [X2:4] =
∫ V¯
0
1− F2:4(x)dx
=
∫ V¯
0
1− 4F (x)3 + 3F (x)4dx
=
∫ V¯
0
1− 4
(
1− e−H(x)
)3
+ 3
(
1− e−H(x)
)4
=
∫ V¯
0
3e−4H(x) − 8e−3H(x) + 6e−2H(x)dx
Proof of Lemma 9. For a general piecewise linear and convex function Hˆ(x) with c linear pieces,
we have
Hˆ(x) =


a0x+ b0 if x1 ≥ x ≥ x0
a1x+ b1 if x2 ≥ x ≥ x1
. . .
acx+ bc if xc+1 ≥ x ≥ xc
where b0 = 0 and aixi+bi = ai−1xi+bi−1, ∀i ≥ 1. x0 = 0, xc+1 = V¯ and xi+1 > xi for all i ≥ 0.
Since Hˆ(x) is convex, ai+1 ≥ ai > 0, for all i. Let I =
∫ V¯
0 3e
−4Hˆ(x)−8e−3Hˆ(x)+6e−2Hˆ(x)−e−Hˆ(x)dx.
I =
c∑
i=0
∫ xi+1
xi
3e−4(aix+bi) − 8e−3(aix+bi) + 6e−2(aix+bi) − e−(aix+bi)dx
=
c∑
i=0
−
[
3e−4(aix+bi)
4ai
]xi+1
xi
+
[
8e−3(aix+bi)
3ai
]xi+1
xi
−
[
3e−2(aix+bi)
ai
]xi+1
xi
+
[
e−(aix+bi)
ai
]xi+1
xi
=
c∑
i=0
1
ai
(
−3e
−4(aixi+1+bi)
4
+
8e−3(aixi+1+bi)
3
− 3e−2(aixi+1+bi) + e−(aixi+1+bi)
)
−
c∑
i=0
1
ai
(
−3e
−4(aixi+bi)
4
+
8e−3(aixi+bi)
3
− 3e−2(aixi+bi) + e−(aixi+bi)
)
=
c∑
i=0
1
ai
(
−3e
−4(aixi+1+bi)
4
+
8e−3(aixi+1+bi)
3
− 3e−2(aixi+1+bi) + e−(aixi+1+bi)
)
+
1
12a0
−
c∑
i=1
1
ai
(
−3e
−4(aixi+bi)
4
+
8e−3(aixi+bi)
3
− 3e−2(aixi+bi) + e−(aixi+bi)
)
.
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For all i ≥ 1 we have that aixi + bi = ai−1xi + bi−1.
I =
∑c
i=0
1
ai
(
−3e−4(aixi+1+bi)4 + 8e
−3(aixi+1+bi)
3 − 3e−2(aixi+1+bi) + e−(aixi+1+bi)
)
+ 112a0 −
∑c
i=1
1
ai
(
−3e−4(ai−1xi+bi−1)4 + 8e
−3(ai−1xi+bi−1)
3 − 3e−2(ai−1xi+bi−1) + e−(ai−1xi+bi−1)
)
=
∑c
i=0
1
ai
(
−3e−4(aixi+1+bi)4 + 8e
−3(aixi+1+bi)
3 − 3e−2(aixi+1+bi) + e−(aixi+1+bi)
)
1
12a0
−∑c−1i=0 1ai+1
(
−3e−4(aixi+1+bi)4 + 8e
−3(aixi+1+bi)
3 − 3e−2(aixi+1+bi) + e−(aixi+1+bi)
)
= 112a0 +
1
ac
(
−3e−4(acxc+1+bc)4 + 8e
−3(acxc+1+bc)
3 − 3e−2(acxc+1+bc) + e−(acxc+1+bc)
)
+
∑c−1
i=0
(
1
ai
− 1
ai+1
)(
−3e−4(aixi+1+bi)4 + 8e
−3(aixi+1+bi)
3 − 3e−2(aixi+1+bi) + e−(aixi+1+bi)
)
.
We add and subtract
∑c
i=1
1
12ai
:
I = 1
ac
(
−3e−4(acxc+1+bc)4 + 8e
−3(acxc+1+bc)
3 − 3e−2(acxc+1+bc) + e−(acxc+1+bc)
)
+ 112a0 +
1
12a1
+ 112a2 + · · · + 112ac − 112a1 − 112a2 − · · · − 112ac
+
∑c−1
i=0
(
1
ai
− 1
ai+1
)(
−3e−4(aixi+1+bi)4 + 8e
−3(aixi+1+bi)
3 − 3e−2(aixi+1+bi) + e−(aixi+1+bi)
)
= 1
ac
(
−3e−4(acxc+1+bc)4 + 8e
−3(acxc+1+bc)
3 − 3e−2(acxc+1+bc) + e−(acxc+1+bc)
)
+
(
1
12a0
− 112a1
)
+
(
1
12a1
− 112a2
)
+ · · ·+
(
1
12ac−1
− 112ac
)
+ 112ac
+
∑c−1
i=0
(
1
ai
− 1
ai+1
)(
−3e−4(aixi+1+bi)4 + 8e
−3(aixi+1+bi)
3 − 3e−2(aixi+1+bi) + e−(aixi+1+bi)
)
= 1
ac
(
−3e−4(acxc+1+bc)4 + 8e
−3(acxc+1+bc)
3 − 3e−2(acxc+1+bc) + e−(acxc+1+bc) + 112
)
+
∑c−1
i=0
(
1
ai
− 1
ai+1
)(
−3e−4(aixi+1+bi)4 + 8e
−3(aixi+1+bi)
3 − 3e−2(aixi+1+bi) + e−(aixi+1+bi) + 112
)
.
Let
g(y) = −3e
−4y
4
+
8e−3y
3
− 3e−2y + e−y + 1
12
.
Taking the derivative gives g′(y) = 3e−4y − 8e−3y + 6e−2y − e−y. Solving for g′(y) = 0 for y ≥ 0
when y = 0, ln
(
5+
√
13
2
)
and as y goes to infinity. For y = 0, g(0) = 0. limy→∞g(y) = 112 . For
y = ln
(
5+
√
13
2
)
,
g
(
ln
(
5 +
√
13
2
))
=
1
12
− 12
(5 +
√
13)4
+
64
3(5 +
√
13)3
− 12
(5 +
√
13)2
+
2
5 +
√
13
> 0.
Since 1
ai
− 1
ai+1
, 1
ac
, acxc+1 + bc and aixi+1 + bi are all strictly positive, I > 0.
Proof of Lemma 10. Since f(x) is continuous, we can pick a δ(ǫ) = δ > 0, such that for any
x, x′ ∈ [a, b] such that |x− x′| < δ, we have |f(x)− f(x′)| < ǫ. Let n be an integer such that
40
b−a
n
< δ, and let xj = a + j · b−an , for j = 0, 1, . . . , n. On each [xj , xj+1] define gǫ(x) to be the
function whose graph is the line segment connecting (xj , f(xj)) with (xj+1, f(xj+1)), i.e. gǫ(x) =
f(xj)+t·(f(xj+1)− f(xj)) for some t ∈ [0, 1]. Since gǫ(x) ∈ [f(xj), f(xj+1)], the Intermediate Value
Theorem implies that for all x ∈ [xj , xj+1] there exists a yj ∈ [xj , xj+1], such that gǫ(x) = f(yj).
Since each x ∈ [a, b] belongs in some [xj , xj+1], the choice of δ implies that |f(x)− gǫ(x)| =
|f(x)− f(yj)| < ǫ. It remains to show that gǫ(x) is convex: by construction, the slope of gǫ(x)
for x ∈ [xj, xj+1] is (f(xj+1)− f(xj)) / (xj+1 − xj), which is strictly increasing with j since f(x) is
convex.
Proof of Lemma 12.
E [X2:2] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))2dx =
∫ ∞
0
e−2H(x)dx
≥
∫ ∞
0
e−H(2x)dx
=
1
2
∫ ∞
0
1− F (x)dx = 1
2
E [X] ,
where the second line holds because H(x) is a convex function. Since E [X1:2] + E [X2:2] = 2E [X],
we have that E [X1:2] = 2E [X] − E [X2:2] ≤ 32E [X]. Therefore, E [X2:2] ≥ 12E [X] ≥ 12 23E [X1:2] =
1
3E [X1:2]. The Lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 13.
E [X1:n]− E [X2:n] =
∫ ∞
0
F2:n(x)− F1:n(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
nFn−1(x)− (n − 1)Fn(x)− Fn(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
nFn−1(x) (1− F (x)) dx
=
∫ ∞
0
nFn−1(x)f(x)
1
h(x)
dx
=
∫ ∞
0
f1:n(x)
1
h(x)
dx
= E
[
1
h(X1:n)
]
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